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Shedding Light on Article 1110 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Concerning Expropriations:
An Environmental Case Study
Jason L. Gudofsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Their bark is bigger than their bite" is an apt way to describe the op-
ponents to Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement'
('NAFTA") concerning investments. This is not to suggest, however, that
the opponents to Chapter 11 have not had tremendous, almost unfathom-
able, success in making their views known to government, business, social
groups and the public generally. Indeed, the opponents are generally cred-
ited for forcing the member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") to abandon their designs on creating
a multilateral agreement on investments ("MAr') which would have ex-
tended similar obligations on the treatment that OECD members would
have had to accord to investors and investments from other OECD coun-
tries. Additionally, even the Government of Canada, a traditional propo-
nent of investment agreements that aim at protecting foreign investors and
investments in third countries, has bowed to political pressure and indicated
its willingness to amend the scope of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
"Jason L. Gudofsky is an associate in the Toronto office of Stikeman Elliott where he
practices principally in the areas of competition (anti-trust), international trade and regula-
tory laws. This paper was originally presented at a joint American Bar Associa-
tion/Canadian Bar Association Conference "NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes:
Litigating Against Sovereigns" held in Washington D.C. on February 1, 2000, and in To-
ronto, Ontario on March 6, 2000. The views expressed in the paper are the views of the
author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views Stikeman Elliott.
1North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA], Dec. 17, 1992, Can. T.S.
1994 No.2 (entered into force January 1, 1994), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992).
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Yet, for all of their bark, when the debate concerning Chapter 11 is
considered, it becomes increasingly clear that the doomsday predictions are
without substance or merit. This is not to suggest that Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA is perfect and not in need of some minor revisions. However, to
suggest that Chapter 11 of the NAFTA will prevent NAFTA Parties from
implementing necessary environmental and social legislation, as many of
the opponents to the Chapter typically do, is to exaggerate and misstate the
possible application of the Chapter.
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA extends important safeguards to NAFTA
investors and investments in order to ensure that they, and their invest-
ments, are treated in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner in
the territory of a host NAFTA Party-Canada, Mexico or the United States
(a "Party" or, collectively, the "Parties"). By imposing the same obliga-
tions on all three Parties, the NAFTA ensures that NAFTA investors and
investments will, at a minimum, be on a "level playing field" with all other
investors, national or foreign, in the territory of a host Party.
While it is true that the NAFTA permits investors to initiate claims
against, and seek monetary compensation from, a NAFTA Party, that is
only true where a Party has violated one of its obligations, such as under
Article 1102 (National Treatment) or Article 1103 (Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment), or has expropriated an investment under Article 1110. The
simple act of initiating a claim is not tantamount to a Party being responsi-
ble to compensate an allegedly injured investor. A claim first must be sub-
stantiated. As discussed below, the existence of a compensable injury is far
from obvious, and, in the context of Article 1110, certainly requires more
than a mere interference with property or a mere reduction in the profitabil-
ity of an investment. Notwithstanding the Ethyl claim, where the Govern-
ment of Canada's decision to compensate an injured investor was driven by
a number of considerations, and certainly not exclusively the merits of the
NAFTA claim, 2 as of October 1, 2000, only four decisions have been ren-
2The detractors to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA often point to the Government of Canada's
decision to settle Ethyl Corporation's ("Ethyl") claim as evidence that the NAFTA Parties
will be severely constrained in their ability to pass necessary environmental legislation. The
facts, however, do not support this conclusion. See M. Sforza & M. Vallianatos, Briefing
Paper: Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to
Challenge Environmental Safeguards, PUBLIC CITIzEN, at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/ha
rmonizationalert/NAFTA/ethyl.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2001).
Briefly, in 1997, Canada enacted the Manganese-based FuelAdditives Act (the "MFAA")
to ban the interprovincial and international sale of "certain manganese-based substances", of
which only methylcyclopentadieny manganese tricarbonyle ("MMT"), a gasoline octane en-
hancer, was enumerated as such a substance. While the MFAA imposed a ban on inter-
provincial and international trade in MMT, it did not ban its use in Canada, nor did it ban
intraprovincial trade in MMT. The Government conceded that, at the time, it did not have
scientific evidence to support the MFAA, but was generally satisfied with the evidence that
the Canadian automobile manufacturers had accumulated as to MMT's harmful effects.
Furthermore, the Government of Canada was concerned that MMT was interfering with the
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dered under NAFTA Chapter 11: Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitan & Ellen
Baw v. The United Mexican States ("DESONA"),3 Waste Management Inc.
v. The United Mexican States ("WMI'", Pope & Talbot v. The Government
of Canada (interim award)("Pope & Talbot',s and Metalclad Corporation
emission control devices that the automobile manufacturers had been installing in automo-
biles in compliance with Canada's emission standards. At the time, Ethyl, a Virginian-based
manufacturer and distributor of MMT, was importing and processing MMT in Ontario, Can-
ada, through a subsidiary corporation. Ethyl was the only supplier of MMT in Canada.
Two separate proceedings were initiated against the Government of Canada in respect to
the MFAA. The first proceeding was initiated by the governments of Alberta, Saskatche-
wan, Qu6bec and Nova Scotia pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Agreement on Internal Trade
(the "AIT") on the basis that, among other things, the MFAA did not serve a legitimate ob-
jective in that the Government of Canada had enacted the MFAA without scientific evidence
and in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. At around the same time, Ethyl initiated a
claim under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA on the basis that, among other things, the MFAA
violated the national treatment and expropriation provisions thereunder. The Government of
Canada brought a preliminary objection to the proceedings on procedural grounds, arguing
that the NAFTA tribunal was without jurisdiction because Ethyl's claim was initiated prior
to the law entering into force, and, therefore, had not crystallized into a "measure" for the
purposes of Article 1101 of Chapter 11.
Prior to the NAFTA tribunal's decision on the Government's challenge to the jurisdiction
of the tribunal, the panel constituted under the AIT found against the Government of Canada
on the basis that, inter alia, while the Government had a reasonable basis for believing that
MFAA would achieve a legitimate objective, the Government failed to establish that the
legislation was not arbitrary. The AIT panel concluded that "[t]he evidence as to the impact
of the MMT on the environment is, at best, inconclusive". Report of the Article 1704 Panel
Concerning a Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding the Manganese-based Fuel
Additives Act, File No.97/98 - 15 MMT - P058 at 2 (June 12, 1998). Shortly following the
AiT panel's decision, the NAFTA panel found against the Government of Canada on the
Government's procedural objections, thus allowing the case to proceed. The Government of
Canada, having lost before the AIT Panel, decided to settle the case with Ethyl, for a re-
ported Cdn $20 million, rather than proceed with the case.
The Ethyl claim does not offer any insight to the application of Chapter 11 to an envi-
ronmental-based claim. The Government of Canada did not have sufficient scientific evi-
dence to support the impugned MFAA. Four provinces, as opposed to a U.S. investor, were
successfully able to establish as much before an arbitral panel. Having lost before the AIT
Panel, the Government decided not to continue with the case before the NAFTA tribunal.
As such, the NAFTA tribunal never made any substantive conclusions regarding the merits
of Ethyl's claim. Furthermore, even if it had, the decision likely would have been tainted by
the fact that the Government lacked suitable scientific evidence to support the MFAA. Ac-
cordingly, while the opponents to the NAFTA often point to the Government of Canada's
decision to compensate Ethyl as proof that Chapter 11 limits the ability of the Parties to im-
plement environmental legislation, the facts do not support such a conclusion.3Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitan & Ellen Baw v. United Mexican States, 14 ICSID
Rev.-FILJ 538 (1999)[hereinafter DESONA].4Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2
(June 2, 2000).5In the Matter of an Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade
Agreement Between Pope & Talbot and The Government of Canada (Arbitral Tribunal June
26,2000) (interim award), at http://www.poptal.com/newsinfo/newsinfo.htm.
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v. The United Mexican States ("Metaclad"). 6 In all four decisions, the
NAFTA arbitral panels applied general principles of international law, with
only the Metalclad case resulting in a finding in favour of the claimant in-
vestor. These cases indicate that NAFTA arbitral tribunals are not likely to
open the floodgates to frivolous claims.
By focusing on the provision of Chapter 11 that has elicited the most
fervent debate, namely Article 1110 concerning expropriations, this paper
attempts to pick through the verbiage regarding, and shed light on, the
meaning of Article 1110. To illustrate the discussion, the acquisition of
MacMillan Bloedel Limited ("MB"), the then largest forest company in
Canada, by Weyerhaeuser Company ("Weyerhaeuser") on November 1,
1999 to create a major global forest company (the "MB Acquisition") is ex-
amined.
Following the above introduction in Section I, the paper is organized as
follows:
In Section II, a general overview of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is pro-
vided. The discussion includes a description of the principal provisions of
the Chapter, as well as a discussion of the law that governs the interpreta-
tion of the Chapter. This is followed by a general overview of expropria-
tions under international law. This discussion is intended to provide a
backdrop to the more detailed discussion concerning expropriations in the
section that follows.
Section III, entitled "Article 1110 of the NAFTA on Expropriation,"
provides a detailed and comprehensive examination of the meaning of the
terms "direct expropriation," "indirect expropriation" and "measures tanta-
mount to an expropriation" under Article 1110 of the NAFTA. It will be
seen that, contrary to the claims made by many of Chapter 1 l's detractors,
there is an established body of law from which to draw principles and
predicative tools for interpreting and understanding Chapter 11. Similar to
many principles of law, whether domestic or international, expropriation
law is not completely settled, or without its hazy areas. However, it is in-
correct to suggest that there are no available precedents or predicative tools
to assist in the interpretation of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
In Section IV, entitled "Article 1110 of the NAFTA and the Environ-
ment", the scope of Article 1110 of the NAFTA is examined in light of the
ability of Parties to enact legislation in support of the environment. Spe-
cifically, the police powers exception under international law is discussed,
both generally and with respect to the interpretation of Article 1110 of the
NAFTA.
In Section V, entitled "Misconception and Confusion over the Appli-
cation of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA," some of the pronouncements on and
6Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 31,
2000) [hereinafter Metalclad].
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criticisms of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA are set out. This will provide a
context to understanding the nature of the concerns raised regarding the
Chapter. The various claims that the Sierra Club of British Columbia (the
"Sierra Club") made in opposition to the MB Acquisition are set out for il-
lustration. In particular, the principal arguments raised by Ms. Jessica
Clogg, a Canadian lawyer, in a legal opinion prepared for, and published
over the Internet by, the Sierra Club (the "Sierra Opinion") in opposition to
the MB Acquisition are outlined.
Next, in Chapter VI, entitled "Article 1110 of the NAFTA and the
MacMillan Bloedel Transaction," the claims raised in the Sierra Opinion
are evaluated with a view to developing a greater understanding of the pos-
sible application of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to the ability of the NAFTA
Parties to pass environmental and other social legislation.
Finally, general conclusions are offered in Section VII of the paper.
Ultimately, through a discussion of the international law of expropria-
tion and, following that, the application of such legal principles to a practi-
cal, real world example (i.e., the MB Acquisition), this paper sheds light on
the scope and application of Article 1110 of the NAFTA on the ability of
the NAFTA Parties to adopt environmental measures.
I. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE NAFTA
A. NAFTA Chapter 11
Building upon the earlier bilateral free trade agreement between Can-
ada and the United States, the NAFTA liberalizes trade and investment
rules between its three signatory countries. The Parties have agreed to re-
duce and, in many cases, eliminate their tariff and non-tariff barriers to tri-
lateral trade. Furthermore, through the NAFTA, the Parties have agreed to
significant disciplines on how the nationals of other Parties are to be treated
in a Party's territory, most notably in respect of services, telecommunica-
tions, intellectual property, government procurement and investments. It is
this latter obligation, namely the one that pertains to investments, that is the
subject matter of this paper.
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA extends significant protection to U.S.,
Mexican and Canadian investors, which includes natural persons, incorpo-
rated and unincorporated entities, and state enterprises, who own or control
investments in the territory of another Party. Section "A" of Chapter 11
sets out the following conditions against which a NAFTA Party's actions
may be measured:
NATIONAL TREATMENT: NAFTA Parties must treat NAFTA investors
and investments as favourably as they treat their own domestic investors
and investments "in like circumstances" (Article 1102);
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MOST-FAVOURED NATION TREATMENT: NAFTA Parties must treat
NAFTA investors and investments as favourably as they treat non-NAFTA
investors and investments "in like circumstances" (Article 1103);
MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT: NAFTA Parties must ensure
that a minimum standard of treatment prescribed by international law, such
as due process of law and natural justice, is provided to NAFTA investors
(Article 1105);
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: NAFTA Parties must not impose or
enforce certain specified performance requirements for the establishment,
operation, management, conduct and operation of investments (Article
1106); and
EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION: NAFTA Parties must not ex-
propriate investments, either directly or indirectly, or through a measure
tantamount to an expropriation, unless such expropriation is for a public
purpose, is non-discriminatory, meets the prescribed international minimum
standard of treatment, and is accompanied by compensation at the fair mar-
ket value (Article 1110).
Perhaps the most innovative feature of the NAFTA is contained at
Section "B" of Chapter 11 wherein NAFTA investors are provided the right
to unilaterally initiate a claim against a host NAFTA Party where any of the
above commitments in Section "A" of Chapter 11 are not met. The inves-
tor-State dispute settlement provisions may not be invoked to enforce any
other provision of the NAFTA.7 Specifically, in DESONA, the Tribunal
explained the scope of Section "B" as follows:
Arbitral jurisdiction under Section B is limited not only as to the persons who
may invoke it (they must be nationals of a State signatory to NAFTA), but also
to the subject matter: claims may not be submitted to investor-state arbitration
under Chapter Eleven unless they are founded upon the violation of an obliga-
tion established in Section A.8
Articles 1115 to 1138 of the NAFTA set out rules for the negotiation
and arbitration of disputes directly between investors and their host Party.
At any time following the sixth month from when a NAFTA Party has vio-
lated one of its above-noted commitments (and advance written notice of
the claim has been provided), but not more than three years from when the
investor first acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge of the alleged
breach, a NAFTA investor may submit a claim to either the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (the "ICSID"), under either
the Convention of the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (the "Convention") or, where either the investor's
home government or the Party is not a signatory to the Convention, to the
7The one exception is that an investor may invoke Section "B" to enforce an obligation
under either Articles 1502(3)(a) or 1503(2), which covers conduct by state enterprises and
monopolies while exercising a regulatory, administrative or other governmental function.
8DESONA, 14 ICSID Rev.-FILJ, at para. 82..
Shedding Light on Article 1110
21:243 (2000)
ICSID's Additional Facility Rules. Alternatively, a dispute can be referred
to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (the
"UNCITRAL").
It is the right of an investor to directly initiate a claim against a Party
that has evoked the most attention by opponents to Chapter 11. The dispute
settlement procedures allow private parties to do something that, to date,
has never been provided for in a multilateral trade agreement: the ability to
directly hold a State accountable for that State's conduct through a binding
dispute settlement mechanism. The opponents to the NAFTA generally
view this right as giving investors an unencumbered "stick" with which
they can wield against NAFTA Parties in those cases where their host
Party's legislation, programs or policies have an adverse impact on their in-
vestment in the territory of a Party. Conversely, for the supporters of
Chapter 11, the dispute settlement provisions represent an important right
which ensures that the Parties will abide by their commitments under
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, and, where their conduct violates Chapter 11,
they can be held directly accountable.
B. The Applicable Law under the NAFTA
It is beyond reproach that, in order to evaluate the potential impact of
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA on the ability of the Parties to regulate in favour
of various "social" or "economic" measures, it is first necessary to delineate
the scope of the Chapter. Many of its key terms, however, are not defined.
The terms "treatment no less favourable" and "like circumstances" in Arti-
cles 1102 and 1103, for example, are not specifically defined by the
NAFTA, nor are the terms "expropriation," "nationalization" or "measures
tantamount to" in Article 1110 defined. Accordingly, in order to assess and
evaluate Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, it is first necessary to understand its
key terms. Unfortunately, as will be discussed below in the context of the
MB Acquisition, many commentators on Chapter 11 either do not examine,
or choose to ignore, the interpretative tools necessary to understand and
evaluate Chapter 11. In this section, these interpretative tools are briefly
examined. This introduction to the law of the NAFTA is also necessary in
order to understand the more comprehensive discussion below regarding the
meaning of expropriation in international law.
The law which applies to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is set out under
Article 1131 as follows:
1. A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute
in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.
2. An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement
shall be binding on a Tribunal under this Section (emphasis added).
Chapter 11 must be interpreted, therefore, in accordance with the fol-
lowing three sources of law: (a) any previous interpretations by the Free
Trade Commission (the "Commission"); (b) the terms of the NAFTA itself,
and (c) general principles of public international law.
Northwestern Journal of
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While the NAFTA directs an arbitral tribunal to consider previous in-
terpretations by the Commission, to date, no such interpretations have been
issued.9 Accordingly, for now, this interpretative tool does not assist in
shedding light on Chapter 11.
Next, it is not insignificant that Article 1131 provides that a Tribunal
shall be guided by the NAFTA as a whole, rather than being restricted to
only the terms of Chapter 11 or, more restrictively, to only Article 1110 it-
self.'0 Of particular importance to forest conservation and environmental
measures, which is the particular subject matter considered in the case study
at Sections V and VI below, are both the Preamble to the NAFTA and the
North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation (the "Envi-
ronmental Side Agreement')."f The Preamble provides that, among other
things, the Parties are resolved to:
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environ-
mental protection and conservation;
PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws and
regulations; 12
The Preamble to the Environmental Side Agreement both confirms and
provides further breadth to each Party's right to regulate in furtherance of
9Some commentators have suggested that the Parties can exclude matters pertaining to
the environment through a Commission interpretation, such as, for example, to exclude
matters pertaining to the environment from the definition of a "measure".
10 For example, in other parts of the NAFTA the Parties have restricted the interpretation
of a provision to either a single paragraph, to a single Article, or to a Chapter. See NAFTA,
supra note 1, Arts. 1134, 10:7, 110:8, and 1213.1. Furthermore, had the Parties intended to
limit the application of Article 1110 to general principles of international law only, they
would not have needed to include Article 1131:1, as Article 102:1 already provides that the
NAFTA shall be interpreted in accordance with applicable rules of international law. See id.
Art. 102:1. Accordingly, when interpreting Article 1110, reference must not only be to gen-
eral principles of international law and to past interpretations by the Commission, but also to
the terms of the NAFTA more generally.
' Article 1114 further confirms each Party's right to regulate in support of the environ-
ment. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1114.
12Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty
"shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The "context"
is further defined to include, among other things, "its preamble". As the NAFTA constitutes
a treaty, as stated at para. 80 of DESONA, the Preamble to the NAFTA could be consulted
for guidance by a tribunal pursuant to Section B of Chapter 1I of the NAFTA. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969). Canada is a Party to the Vienna Convention, having acceded to the Con-
vention on October 14, 1970. See id.
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the environment. 13 Article 3 of the Environmental Side Agreement explic-
itly provides that each Party has the right "to establish its own levels of do-
mestic environmental protection and environmental development policies
and priorities, to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and
regulations," as well as imposing a duty to "ensure that its laws and regula-
tions provide for high levels of environmental protection."
The NAFTA, therefore, directs the Parties to legislate in support of the
environment and sustainable development. While the exact weight that a
tribunal appointed under the NAFTA would place on these provisions is not
yet known, a tribunal would, at the very least, be informed by them. In
Metalclad, for example, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal referred to NAFTA's
Preamble as evidence that the Chapter was designed to encourage invest-
ments and that the Parties are committed to ensuring transparency in their
laws and administrative procedures. 4 As described in Section IV below,
the Preamble and the Environmental Side Agreement may give both weight
and breadth to the application of the police power defense when interpreting
Article 1110 of the NAFTA.
Finally, Article 1131 provides that the NAFTA shall be interpreted in
accordance with general principles of international law. Generally speaking,
the relevant sources of international law are encompassed in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the "Statute of the ICJ") as
follows:
38(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
15
Any discussion as to the scope and meaning of Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA, and Article 1110 more narrowly, must be considered in accor-
dance with above described interpretative tools and sources of law. In the
13 Article 2201 provides that the Annexes constitute an integral part of the NAFTA.
14Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 para. 71
(Aug. 31, 2000).
15While stated with respect to the ICJ, these sources "are generally regarded as reflecting
a complete statement of the sources of international law." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (4 th ed. 1990).
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Sections that follow, the international law of expropriation is considered
with a view to shedding light on the scope and application of Chapter 11 of
the NAFTA. This discussion will then be applied to the MB Acquisition.
C. The Law of Expropriation
As noted, while the NAFTA Parties agreed to extend a number of sub-
stantive safeguards to NAFTA investors and investments under Chapter 11,
this paper focuses on Article 1110 concerning expropriations only. While
Section "I" provides a detailed examination of the international law of ex-
propriation, immediately below is a general overview of expropriation law.
It is now widely accepted that every State has a right to expropriate and
nationalize private property situated within its territory, regardless of
whether the subject property is owned by a national or by an alien. Interna-
tional law, however, is only concerned with the latter.
A right to expropriate property is essentially a manifestation of the
principle of territorial sovereignty and, to some extent, has its roots in utili-
tarian concepts of ownership. The primary concern of international law is
to ensure that property owned by aliens is only taken when it advances
public utility, is non-discriminatory and is accompanied by adequate com-
pensation. 16 However, this merely states a legal conclusion. It does not
shed light on or ultimately settle when a measure gives right to a concomi-
tant obligation on a State to compensate injured foreign nationals. As well,
it does not describe the inherent limitations on the manner by which States
may exercise their sovereign power over property. To this end, James Hyde
notes that:
It is generally recognized as a matter of law that a state has the power to con-
trol and use its natural resources and therefore to acquire property within its ju-
risdiction. It would be an over-simplification to assert this principle can stand
alone, without considering the treaties as well as international agreements or
other form of estoppel which may qualify the exercise of that power.17
An expropriation generally refers to a small-scale taking or depriva-
tion."8 It is usually directed at the property of a particular owner but may, in
some instances, extend to a group of properties. An expropriation is often
described by reference to a certain class or type of measure. Alternatively,
it may be described by the effect which the impugned measure has on a
16See B.A. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1959); Timo-
thy B. Hansen, The Legal Effect Given Stabilization Clauses in Economic Development
Agreements, 28 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1015, 1026 (1988); G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking
of Property under International Law, 1962 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 307; WAYNE MAPP, THE
UNITED-STATES CLAIMs TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 1981-1991 163 (1993).
17James N. Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 854, 862 (1956).
'
8See Lianlian Lin and John R. Allison, An Analysis of Expropriation and Nationaliza-
tion Risk in China, 19 YALE J. INT'L. L. 135, 139 (1994).
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property owner. This problem of reference pervades the entire expropria-
tion issue and likely explains why much of the intellectual and judicial dis-
course on the subject is confused t9
In establishing an expropriation, the issue essentially boils down to
whether it requires that a State actually take or acquire something, or
whether it is sufficient to substantiate a claim on the basis that a property
owner has suffered a loss. The distinction is important in determining the
scope and meaning of the legal term "expropriation." If the definition of
expropriation is restricted to instances where a State actually acquires title,
then, while simplifying the legal inquiry, the scope of the matter is very
limited. However, where the focus is on the loss suffered by a property
owner, then the scope is wider; it would capture both a direct taking and an
interference with the use and enjoyment of property. Although discussed at
greater length infra, it is important to be aware of the varying scope which
attaches to the term expropriation. In the context of the NAFTA, the wider
the scope, the greater is the protection given to NAFTA investors.
Although gradual in its acceptance, international law has now gener-
ally adopted a wide definition of an expropriation. It includes both a taking
and a deprivation of property. Referring to the impact of a taking on a
property owner, Wortley explains that:
There are, indeed, many different methods of expropriation, but, so far as the
dispossessed owner is concerned, they all deprive him of making his claims
within the jurisdiction of the expropriating State. They do not necessarily rid
the "owner" of his conviction that he is the owner, and that he should be enti-
19This problem is made worse because highly specific and descriptive language is often
used in a manner which confuses the nature of an expropriation. In some instances an ex-
propriation is referred to as a "taking", in others as an "acquisition", while still in others as a
"deprivation". Furthermore, the actual act of taking has been described variously as "creep-
ing", "de facto", "disguised" and "constructive". As a result of this confusion in the termi-
nology, Weston recommends that the term "welfare deprivation" be used since, according to
him, it removes the normative elements which is the subject matter of the police power and
instead examines the actual effect of an action or inaction on a property holder. Accord-
ingly, Weston argues that in Bums H. Weston, 'Constructive Takings' Under International
Law: A Modest Foray Into The Problem of 'Creeping Expropriation', 16 VA. J. INT'L L.
103, 111 (1975-1976):
loose talk looms ominously over any attempt to deal forthrightly with the "constructive taking"
problem; however, not simply because of the potentially curable ambiguities that evolve from the
unabated, indiscriminate use of expressions like "taking" and "exercise of the power of eminent do-
main" (or their complementary but equally equivocal opposites, "regulation" and "exercise of the
police power"). The basic point is that such words and phrases, with all their normative overtones,
tend more often to describe a result than to define the process by which the result is reached. With-
out facilitating discrimination between fact and legal consequence, they assume the answer to the
principal question that is at issue in the first place - the compensation question -and, in so doing, di-
vert attention from the many variables that can and do bear critically upon it.
For the purposes of this paper, though not trying to contribute to the overall confusion,
the above terms are used interchangeably.
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tied, if not to secure his reinstatement as owner, then at least to claim some
compensation for this disappointment.2°
Although a broad definition of an expropriation does not legally pre-
clude a State from taking or affecting property, because it is accompanied
by a related obligation to provide compensation, it can, theoretically, impact
on the types of policies which a government adopts. For the purposes of
this paper, it is sufficient to conclude that an expropriation refers to either a
taking or deprivation of property by a State, directly or indirectly, as against
the interests of a single or small group of property owners. The degree of
interference or deprivation necessary for a measure to constitute an expro-
priation, however, is discussed below.
While an expropriation refers to the deprivation of an individual prop-
erty or small number of properties, a nationalization generally refers to a
large-scale "impersonal taking of the economic structure in full or in part
for the nation's benefit.. .,2' A nationalization generally arises from some
form of social, political or economic reform or upheaval. Furthermore, it
tends to apply broadly and cover an entire industry or large geographic area.
This said, as a practical matter, there is not much difference between both
types of takings. Wortley provides that a nationalization differs from an
expropriation in its "scope rather than in its juridical nature." For the pur-
poses of this paper, only expropriations are specifically considered.
III. ARTICLE 1110 OF THE NAFTA ON EXPROPRIATION
Article 1110(1) of the NAFTA provides that no Party may "directly" or
"indirectly" nationalize or expropriate an investment, or take any "measure
tantamount to" a nationalization or expropriation of an investment,22 of an
investor of another Party, unless it is for a public purpose,23 is non-
discriminatory,24 complies with the requirements for minimum international
standards of treatment in Article 1105 and due process of law,2 and is ac-
26th
companied by compensation. While the Parties are free to expropriate
20 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis in original).
21Nicholas R. Doman, Postwar Nationalization for Foreign Property in Europe, 48
COLUM. L. REv. 1125 (1948). As well, Wortley, supra note 16, at 36, provides that:
The word 'nationalization' is not a term of art, but it usually signifies expropriation in pursuance of
some national political programme intended to create out of existing enterprises, or to strengthen, a
nationally controlled industry. Nationalization differs in its scope and extent rather than in its juridi-
cal nature from other types of expropriation.
22For the purposes for this discussion, the words "investment", as defined under Article
1139 of the NAFTA, and "property" are used interchangeably.
23NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1110:1 (a).241d. Art. 1110:1(Ib).
251d. Art. 1110:1(C).
261d. Art. 1110:1(d). The NAFTA requires that compensation be paid at full market
value. For all intents and purposes, the NAFTA adopts the Hull Formula of "prompt, ade-
quate and effective" compensation.
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NAFTA investments, they may only do so in accordance with the above re-
quirements.
In the subsections that follow, the meaning of the terms "direct expro-
priation," "indirect expropriation," and "measures tantamount to" an expro-
priation under Article 1110 of the NAFTA are considered. The analysis is
fundamental because it sheds light on the dividing line between a mere in-
terference with an investment, which is not covered under Article 1110 of
the NAFTA, and an expropriation, which is covered under the Article.
A. Direct Expropriation
A direct expropriation is generally not difficult to detect. It involves a
formal decree or measure directing a single property owner (or a group of
owners) to relinquish both title and possession over its (or their) property.
Examples may include a government taking an entire parcel of land in order
to establish a park, a road or a nature reserve. A direct expropriation is
generally obvious since it requires that title be permanently relinquished to
a host State.27
The primary debate over direct expropriations, outside of the debate
over standards of compensation generally, involves situations where a State
removes only part of a subject property or where there are consequential
losses arising from a direct expropriation. The case law, though mostly
concerned with interferences rather than direct takings, seems to indicate
that in some instances a partial taking is sufficient for establishing a com-
pensatory injury.28 By way of example, in the early 1980s, the Federal
Government of Canada recommended a 25% hold-back on gas permits un-
der the National Energy Program ("NEP"). Olmstead et al. argued that the
Canadian Government would be liable to foreign permit holders for the loss
27 See HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS AND HAROLD HoNGJU KoH, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS- MATERIALS AND TEXT 450 (40" ed. 1994).28The Upton Case provides a good example of a compensable injury being founded on
the basis of a partial taking. In that case, the Venezuelan Government had requisitioned the
Claimant's property, including a boat and steel lighter, in order to help in its defence against
warring rebels. When the Venezuelan government returned the property to the Claimant, it
was severely damaged. The Commission awarded the Claimant $3,000 of the $3,500 re-
quested on the basis that it had not been entirely destroyed since it retained some value. Pre-
sumably, the Commission was willing to find that most but not all of the Claimant's interest
in the launch had been taken by the Venezuelan Government. See Upton Case, in
VENEZUELAN ARBrrRATioNs oF 1903 172 (prepared by Jackson H. Ralston, 1904). As well,
in Houston Contracting, despite the fact that the Iranian government had exercised its con-
trol over the Claimant's entire equipment, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal only
awarded damages for the amount actually used by the Revolutionary Guard. Houston Con-
tracting Company v. Nat'l Oil Co., 20 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1988).
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of partial rights on the basis that such loss amounted to an expropriation
over that part of the interest removed.2 9
While taking most of an owner's property is likely sufficient to estab-
lish an expropriation, there must be more than a de minimis effect on the
property. To this end, Herz notes that:
If, however, a measure indirectly interferes with property, e.g., by diminishing
its value through certain acts, or by burdening the whole of the property of an
individual with pecuniary obligations (taxation), the question of degree be-
comes important. If it remains within certain usual limits, such interference is
deemed not to be an expropriation of part or the whole of the property; but if it
exceeds certain limits it is said to constitute partial expropriation.
The other main contentious issue concerning the definition of a direct
expropriation involves a situation where a State, by taking one property,
unintentionally expropriates another. The Case Concerning Certain Ger-
man Interests in Polish Upper Silesia3' provides an apt illustration of this
point.
In that case, the Polish Government, upon assuming control over cer-
tain German territory, enacted legislation whereby it purported to expropri-
ate a German nitrate factory owned by Oberschlesische Stickstoffivere A.-G.
("Oberschlesische") at Chorzow, in Upper Silesia. The actual patents, li-
censes, machinery and equipment were owned and operated by a separate
German company, Bayrische Stickstoffiverke A-G. ("Bayrische"). Germany
claimed that by taking over the nitrate factory Poland had expropriated both
companies. Poland countered that it only intended to expropriate the pro-
prietary interests of Oberschlesische and not those of Bayrische. The Per-
manent Court of International Justice found against the Polish Government,
because, irrespective of its intentions, it had, in fact, expropriated the inter-
ests of both companies.3 2 Poland was thus held liable to compensate both
German companies.
A similar finding was reached in the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims
where a Tribunal found that the United States government had expropriated
the Claimants' contractual rights and physical property in certain ships, de-
29Cecil J. Olmstead, Edward J. Krauland and Diane F. Orentlicher, Expropriation in the
Energy Industry: Canada's Crown Share Provision as a Violation of International Law, 29
MCGILL L.J. 439 (1984).30John Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 AM. J. INT'L. L. 243 (1941). Simi-
larly, Wayne Mapp noted that while there is little argument that a direct taking amounts to a
compensable injury, the only question is at what point this occurs. MAPP, supra note 16, at
151.
31 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 7 (May 25)[hereinafter Polish Silesia].321t should be kept in mind that this case was raised and decided pursuant to Head III of
the Geneva Convention and, to a lesser extent, the Treaty of Versailles. However, in light of
the fact that the case has been cited by numerous authors and in numerous judicial decisions,
it likely now reflects international law.
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spite the United States' contention that it had only intended on taking the
latter.33 These cases appear to support the proposition that a taking may be
found even where a government does not purport to expropriate a particular
parcel of property.
The existence of a direct taking is fairly obvious. Unless a State denies
liability, for example, where property is taken under a treaty or pursuant to
its police powers,, the debate concerning direct takings generally revolves
around compensation.3 5 Hence, it is sufficient to note that a direct taking
refers to a situation where a property holder is forced to relinquish title in
his or her property.3 6
B. Indirect Expropriation
The difference between a direct expropriation and an indirect one is
that, unlike in the case of the former, the latter generally does not result in a
property owner relinquishing title to his or her property. Although some ju-
rists argue that an expropriation should be limited to instances where prop-
erty is formally taken, both case law and jurists overwhelmingly
acknowledge that a taking may occur absent a direct incursion on title.37
33Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. U.S.) I R.I.A.A. 307 (1922). Although
this case, like Polish Upper Silesia, has been cited by many jurists and in numerous deci-
sions, it should be kept in mind that the United States had already admitted liability. The
only issue for the arbitral tribunal was assessing compensation. As well, the United States,
upset with the amount of compensation awarded, attached a note providing that it did not
view the decision as setting precedent. The case, however, has been cited with approval on
many occasions, particularly as it pertains to whether a State must "intend" to expropriate
property in order for liability to attach.34See discussion infra p. 46.35This paper does not explore the international standard of compensation. Paragraph 2 of
Article 1110 of the NAFTA, however, states that compensation "shall be equivalent to the
fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took
place, and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation
had become known earlier." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110:2. As of October 1, 2000,
Metalclad, is the only NAFTA Chapter 11 case in which the appropriate standard of com-
pensation is considered. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 31, 2000).
36It is not necessarily true that the title vests in the State, since, theoretically, the State
can transfer title to a third person, depending on the circumstances.
37For example, in Computer Sciences Corp. v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal found in favour of the Claimant despite the fact that there
had not been a formal decree to expropriate the Claimant's property. 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 269 (1987). Similarly, in Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Tribunal
noted that "[t]he unilateral taking of possession of property and the denial of its use to the
rightful owners may amount to an expropriation even without a formal decree regarding title
to the property." 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 212, 213 (1985).
In Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, the Tribunal held that "[a) depri-
vation or taking* of property may occur under international law through interference by a
state in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to
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Notionally, the requirement to compensate property owners for losses
arising through an indirect expropriation imposes a much greater limitation
on the ability of a government to regulate and adopt other measures that, di-
rectly or indirectly, interfere with property rights. Unlike in the case of a
direct expropriation, an indirect expropriation does not result in a formal
loss of title or dispossession of property by its owner. Art indirect expro-
priation often occurs in instances where a government does not "intend" to
take property.38 Typically, an indirect expropriation occurs where a gov-
ernment is trying to regulate, provide order, protect the environment or ad-
vance some other social, health or economic objective. However, at least
when measured against the effect that an impugned measure has on a prop-
erty owner, the impact of an indirect expropriation on a property owner is
the same as is a direct expropriation; in both cases, a property owner loses
most or all of the benefits of the use and/or enjoyment of his or her prop-
erty. Considered in this manner, the impact of a direct and an indirect ex-
propriation is effectively the same and, therefore, should give rise to
identical rights in law.
There is a general misunderstanding of the meaning of the term "indi-
rect" in the context of an expropriation. Reference to "indirect," or for that
matter "direct," merely describes the manner by which the injury occurs. It
does not alter the fact that ultimately, there must be an expropriation. Con-
sidered as such, from the perspective of an investor, there is no practical
difference between a direct and an indirect expropriation.
An indirect expropriation, therefore, describes a situation where an
alien property holder has suffered a significant loss over the use and/or en-
joyment of his or her property.39 Wallace provides that an indirect expro-
priation may derive through a host of measures which on their surface
appear legitimate40 but in effect are expropriatory.41 The difficulty is in
the property is not affected." 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225 (1984) [hereinafter Tip-
pets]; see also Reza Said Malek v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 246, 286 (1996); Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo , 21
I.L.M. 740 (1982).3 8Notwithstanding Polish Upper Silesia and the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims exam-
ined above, a direct taking generally occurs where a government intends on acquiring prop-
erty.39Sandrino explains the essence of an indirect, or creeping, expropriation in the follow-
ing manner. Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct In-
vestment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 317 n.276
(1994):
measures whereby the government increasingly imposes restrictions and controls, such as, excessive
and repetitive tax regulatory measures, on the foreign investment enterprise so as to make it difficult
to continue in business at a profit ... It is the cumulative effect of the measures which then has a de
facto confiscatory effect in that their combined effect results in depriving the investor of ownership,
control, or substantial benefits over his enterprise, even when each such measure taken separately
does not have this effect.40
"Legitimate" here does not refer to valid but rather whether it invokes a duty to com-
pensate a property owner.
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determining the demarcation between a compensable and a non-
compensable injury. Weston noted that such a distinction, in what he
termed the "expropriation-regulation" dilemma, has been lacking among le-
gal scholars:
[F]ailure of international law scholars and practitioners to provide anything
remotely approaching a systematic appraisal of the many ways in which aliens,
not the targets of" confiscation", "expropriation", "nationalization", or "requi-
sition" stricto sensu, can be and have been effectively deprived, in whole or in
part, of the "use and enjoyment" of their foreign-based wealth by the exercise
of so-called police powers.
42
The following subsections attempt to illustrate some of the methods by
which an indirect expropriation may (or may not) arise.
1. Government Interference with Peaceful Use and Enjoyment of Property:
Effects-Based Test
Some jurists argue that an effects-based test is sufficient for determin-
ing whether a governmental measure or interference amounts to an expro-
priation. Under this approach, the inquiry rests entirely on the effect that a
governmental measure has on property owned or controlled by an alien.
Rosalyn Higgins adopted this approach as a suitable means for establishing
an indirect expropriation, as follows:
[T]here seems to be a tendency to define "taking" in terms not of the amount or
quality of interference with those rights normally associated with property, but
in terms of whether the methods were unlawful and whether compensation was
paid. This is, with the greatest respect, to confuse the question of a definition
with the question of a legal justification. 43
This method requires a tribunal to establish a line between when a
government's measure goes "too far" and imposes too great an interference
41 Wallace provides the following list of possible techniques (some of these will be ex-
plored further in this subsection):
unreasonable taxation; discriminatory legislation and administrative decrees; certain cases of zoning;
the granting, in certain cases, of a monopoly by a government; prolonged 'temporary seizure'; un-
reasonable price ceilings which are not allowed to keep pace with inflationary trends; the rendering
useless of property by the expropriation of other property so intimately connected with the first that
it ceases to have any further value or function; the forced sale of alien property at a price which falls
far short of the actual value of the property or of its real worth had its use not been interfered with by
the state; the setting of local wages at prohibitively high rates; the appointment of custodians, man-
agers or inspectors who substantially impair the free use by the alien of his premises and facilities;
the appointment of a receiver to liquidate a commercial enterprise or other property; unreasonable
contract renegotiation or discriminatory contract termination; prohibition of gainful activity previ-
ously lawfully engaged in; and any other means of such unreasonable interference with the property
rights of the alien owner that he is effectively deprived of the use and beneficial enjoyment of his
holdings.
CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
277 (1983)42Weston, supra note 19, at 106.43Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Properly by the State: Recent Developments in Inter-
national Law, III RECUEIL DES CouRs 263, 328 (U.N. Collection of Courses, 1982).
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with the use and enjoyment of property. 4 Of course, the line is passed
when all property rights are formally taken, the more difficult question is
determining whether, in the circumstances of a particular case, there has
been a sufficient deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property to
amount to a compensable injury.45 This sub-subsection examines when and
how much interference is necessary in order to find that a deprivation of the
use or enjoyment of property amounts to an (indirect) expropriation.
The first step in determining whether a measure has an expropriatory
effect is to examine whether the interference is reasonable. According to
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,46 for example, "a taking of property may oc-
"For example, in American Bell Int'l Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Claimant U.S.
Corporation was not only denied access to its bank account but was also forced to transfer its
funds to the Telecommunications Company of Iran (the two companies had been involved in
ajoint project). In finding for the Claimant, the Tribunal noted that "where, as here, both the
purpose and effect of the acts are totally to deprive one of funds without one's voluntarily
given consent, the finding of a compensable taking under any applicable law - international
or domestic - is inevitable, unless there is clear justification for the seizure." 12 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 170,214 (1988).45Although referring to takings under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
Cormack notes that an important distinction exists between a deprivation of possession and a
deprivation of use:
A choice, in eminent domain cases, between the concepts which have been discussed involves im-
portant consequences. Under the physical concept it is necessary, in order that compensation to the
condenmee be required, that he be deprived of the possession of land or some other tangible physical
object. Under the mental concept, it is only necessary that there be interference with some of the le-
gal relations which, from the standpoint of this concept, constitute his property.
Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, XLI YALE L.J.
221,224 (1932)
This distinction is no longer particularly relevant. Although in both Mariposa Develop-
ment Co. v. U. S. -Panama Claims Commission and Mavis Daley v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
the adjudicators looked for an actual loss of possession. The former case, however, is
somewhat dated and the latter one is anomalous in light of a plethora of contrary decisions
by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The case law consistently demonstrates that a taking may
be substantiated whether or not alien retains title and/or the interference is on less than the
entire property. A deprivation of use (i.e., the "mental concept") can refer to either the mar-
ketability and value of property or to the right to exercise effective "control, use and benefit"
over property. This sub-subsection is concerned with cases where compensation was
awarded despite the fact that a claimant retained title and/or possession of his/her property.
See Mariposa Development Co. v. U.S. -Panama Claims Commission, 7. I.L.R. 255, 257
(1933); Mavis Daley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 232 (1988)46As provided at paragraph 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, a tribunal may have reference
to judicial decisions in determining a rule of law. For example, in Metalclad, the NAFTA
arbitral tribunal had reference to Biloune, et. al. v. Ghana Investment Centre et. al., in char-
acterizing the Mexican Government's actions as expropriatory for the purposes of Article
1110 of the NAFTA. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1 para. 108 (Aug. 31, 2000); Biloune, et. al. v. Ghana Investment Centre et. al.,
95 I.L.R. 183 (1993), In the same manner, therefore, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal's deci-
sions may inform the law of expropriation. By way of background, the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal was established after the Government of Iran seized U.S. hostages at the U.S. em-
bassy in Tehran and, in retaliation, the U.S. Government seized Iranian assets located in the
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cur by virtue of unreasonable interference in the use of that property... , A7
The inquiry rests on determining what constitutes a reasonable interference.
For example, in Malek, after finding against the Claimant, the Tribunal
noted that:
Although the Claimant's above evidence suggest that the Iranian Authorities
were parking their cars on the Wooden Land during the relevant jurisdictional
period, the Tribunal does not believe that such activity implies sufficient inter-
ference to be deemed a taking. It probably amounts to trespassing or, at most,
the initial steps in a series of events which ultimately may have ripened into a
more or less irreversible deprivation of the Wooden Land. The physical al-
teration of that property by the construction of roads and buildings, on the
other hand, would entail a degree of interference that is more than sufficient to
find a taking. The Claimant's evidence, however, is unclear on the question of
whether this alteration occurred during the relevant jurisdictional period.48
The above statement raises the following question: what constitutes
"enough"? In other words, although the Tribunal discussed what it consid-
ered to be "more than" and "less than" sufficient, the Tribunal did not clar-
ify the exact level or degree of interference that shifts a measure from being
reasonable to unreasonable.
United States. To resolve the dispute, the two governments agreed to establish a tribunal to
adjudicate losses arising out of, inter alia, the Iranian Revolution. The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal was struck pursuant to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic ofAlgeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (January 19,
1981) (the "Declaration"). According to the Declaration, the Tribunal can consider claims
arising out of numerous matters, including expropriations and "other measures affecting
property rights". DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,
Jan. 19, 1981, Art. 111(2), reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 9, 10 (1983). Since its inception,
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has considered hundreds of cases under international law and
in accordance with the Declaration. While the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal may serve as a
good source of case law, a word of caution is necessary. Because the Declaration uses the
phrase "other measures affecting property", it extends beyond the scope of Article 1110 of
the NAFTA. This caution was expressed by the NAFTA arbitral tribunal in Pope & Talbot,
where the NAFTA arbitral tribunal refused to rely on the decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal to extend the scope of Article 1110 through the word "tantamount" used in that Ar-
ticle. See Pope & Talbott, supra note 5, at para. 104. That said, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal's decisions are informative to the extent that they set out general principles of
international law or help to explain how certain measures may be characterized as an expro-
priation. For example, in Metalclad, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal cited a decision of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in determining the applicable standard of compensation at inter-
national law. Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 at para. 122.
47Ataollah Golpira v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
171, 176-177 (1984) (emphasis added).
48 Reza Said Malek v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
246, 290 (1996) (emphasis added).
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That said, it appears that a mere hindrance or restriction on the use of
property will not constitute an expropriation. Presumably, this gives a gov-
ernment a considerable amount of leeway when, for example, implementing
conservation measures. On the other hand, a substantial interference, par-
ticularly one which will exist for a significant period of time, will likely be
sufficient to constitute an expropriation.4 9
In addition to, or in lieu of, a reasonableness-based test, the Iran-
United States Tribunal, beginning with 1TT Industries,50 also adopted an
ephemeral test for determining the existence of a taking. In both 1T In-
dustries and TAMS-AFFA the Tribunal held that:
[W]hile assumption of control over property by a government does not auto-
matically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken
by the government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such
a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was de-
prived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation
is rot merely ephemeral.
The Tribunal recognized that a taking may be found even where legal
title is not disturbed 2 Accordingly, under this test posited by the Tribunal,
a taking may be substantiated where its effect on a property owner is more
than ephemeral.
In Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal adopted a substantiality
test similar to the one consistently applied by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu-
nal. That case arose out of Canada's implementation of the Softwood Lum-
ber Agreement between the Governments of Canada and the United States
(the "SLA"). Under the SLA, Canada agreed to limit exports to the U.S. of
49That a taking will be found where a government's interference is permanent and sub-
stantial is consistent with the Tribunal's earlier decisions in both Harza Eng'g Co v. Gov't of
the Islamic of Republic of Iran and in Dames and Moore. Harza Eng'g Coy. Gov't of the
Islamic of Republic of Iran, I Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499 (1983) [hereinafter Harza];
Dames & Moore v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 212, 213 (1985).
Once again, however, there is no bright line test as to when a measure becomes unreason-
able. For example, in Harza, the Tribunal did not find that the measures taken by the Iranian
Government were unreasonable since, although onerous, they were necessary for ensuring
that only authorized bank withdrawals were made. See generally Harza, I Iran-U.S. CI.
Trib. Rep. Although the requirements imposed by the Respondent on the Claimant with-
drawing its money were fairly onerous, the Tribunal determined that it did not amount to a
taking because it was not sufficiently unreasonable. On the other hand, in Dames and
Moore, the Tribunal found that the Government's decision to deny the Claimant access to its
stored equipment was "so complete that it must be deemed unreasonable." Dames & Moore,
4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep at 223. While title remained vested in the Claimant, the Tribunal
found that a taking had occurred since the Claimant had been effectively separated from and
denied rights to his property.
50ITT Industries v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 348 (1983).
511d. at 351-352; Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 219, 225-26 (1984).52See Tippets, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 225; Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Gov't of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983).
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softwood lumber first manufactured in the provinces of British Columbia,
Alberta, Ontario and Qu6bec through the adoption of a scheme that effec-
tively operated as a tariff-rate-quota (i.e., imposing progressively higher
fees on the export of softwood lumber over certain prescribed levels). Can-
ada implemented this scheme through its Export and Import Permits Act
(Canada) under which it placed softwood lumber from the four enumerated
provinces on Canada's Export Control List. The Claimant, Pope & Talbot,
Inc., a Delaware company, complained that its investments, Pope & Talbot
Ltd. and (later) Harmac Pacific Inc., both British Columbia companies, had
been expropriated, effectively on the basis that its investments had "suf-
fered injury to its business operations, its expansion and management, and
its overall profitability." 3 The Government of Canada denied that there
had been an expropriation, pointing to the fact that, among other things, the
Claimant's mills, profits and shares were not seized, it continued to export a
considerable amount of lumber to the U.S., it remained profitable, it re-
tained ownership of its investments, the price of lumber went up (i.e., as a
result of the decreased supply required under the SLA), and the SLA helped
prevent a broader trade war with the U.S. On the basis of these facts, the
NAFTA arbitral tribunal was of the view that Canada's Export Control Re-
gime was not sufficiently onerous to amount to an expropriation. Specifi-
cally, the Tribunal stated that the impugned measure was not "substantial
enough to be characterized as an expropriation under international law."54
Further, the Tribunal noted that "the test is whether that interference is suf-
ficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has been
'taken' from the owner".55
The key consideration, therefore, is determining what constitutes
"ephemeral" or "substantial. 5 6 Subject to the police powers exception dis-
53 Pope & Talbot, supra note 5, at para. 86. In addition to Article 1110, the Claimant also
raised the following Articles: 1102, 1103, 1105 and 1106. The interim award dealt with the
Claimant's arguments under Articles 1106 and 1110.
54Id. at para. 96.
55Id. at para. 102.56In Metalclad, for example, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal was clearly of the view that the
Government of Mexico, through the actions of the local government, had gone too far, ef-
fectively ending the Claimant Investor's opportunity to operate its hazardous waste landfill
in La Pedrera (the Guadalcazar region), Mexico. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 31, 2000). In that case, the Claimant had received
numerous federal permits to construct and operate a landfill, as well as assurances that it did
not need any approvals from the local government for that purpose. Independent studies by
the Autonomous University of SLP and the Mexican Federal Attorney's Office for the Pro-
tection of the Environment both indicated that, although certain improvements were neces-
sary, provided that the appropriate engineering requirements were made, the site was
geographically suitable for a landfill. Nonetheless, the local government was opposed to the
landfill and was determined to shut it down. In particular, the local government complained
that the Claimant failed to apply for and receive the necessary construction permit, notwith-
standing that the federal government had assured the Claimant that this was not necessary.
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cussed infra, an expropriation would seemingly occur where a measure re-
suits in either a substantial, total or effective loss of an alien's property
right(s). On the other hand, where a measure, such as a forest conservation
plan or zoning by-law, merely acts as a hindrance, but is otherwise reason-
able, an expropriation is not likely to be found. In this respect, Herz pro-
vided that:
If, however, a measure indirectly interferes with property, e.g., by diminishing
its value through certain acts, or by burdening the whole of the property of an
individual with pecuniary obligations (taxation), the question of degree be-
comes important. It remains within certain usual limits, such interference is
deemed not to be expropriation of part or the whole property; but if it exceeds
certain limits it is said to constitute partial expropriation.
Ultimately, the problem rests in identifying, and then defining, the gray
area between a taking and a non-compensable injury. The case law of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal suggests that a case-by-case analysis is the most
appropriate method. While doctrinally this is an unsatisfying answer, par-
ticularly for the opponents of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA who want predict-
The Claimant made numerous attempts to settle the issue, even entering into an agreement -
the "Convenio" - with two independent, governmental sub-agencies whereby Metalclad
agreed to, among other things, carry out an environmental audit and perform any remedia-
tion considered necessary (the audit revealed certain deficiencies, which Metalclad was go-
ing to ameliorate as per the Convenio), designate 34 hectares of its property as a buffer zone
for the conservation of endemic species, contribute money towards social works in
Guadalcazar, provide a discount for the treatment and final disposition of hazardous waste
generated in SLP, provide one day per week of free medical advice to the inhabitants of
Guadalcazar, employ manual labourers from within Guadalcazar and give preference to the
inhabitants of Guadalcazar for technical training. The local government refused to partici-
pate in the negotiation of the Convenio. Instead, it remained steadfast in its opposition to the
landfill, continuing to justify its non-support on the fact that the Claimant had failed to re-
ceive the necessary construction permits (although the Claimant pointed out that there was
no evidence that the local government had ever required or issued a municipal construction
permit for another project in Guadalcazar, or even that there was an administrative process
for doing so). All the while, the federal government of Mexico remained supportive of the
landfill, continuing to issue permits to Metalclad. Finally, nearly three years after the dis-
pute arose, the Governor (local government) issued an Ecological Decree declaring the sub-
ject area a Natural Area for the protection of rare cactus. The Ecological Decree ended any
opportunity for Metalclad to operate its landfill. On the basis of these facts, the NAFTA ar-
bitral tribunal was of the view that the local government had gone too far in that it effec-
tively denied the Claimant from operating any part of its investment. The NAFTA tribunal
was satisfied that the expropriation occurred prior to the pronouncement of the Ecological
Decree. The decision is certainly consistent with the case law of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal in that the local government's interference with the Claimant's investment was more
than ephemeral by effectively preventing the Claimant from using and enjoying its invest-
ment. The NAFTA arbitral tribunal did not even consider the police powers defense, pre-
sumably because it was satisfied that the local government's conduct was not aimed at
protecting the local environment or the health and welfare of the local community (i.e., as a
result of favourable findings by independent studies and the Claimant's obligations under the
Convenio). See generally Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1.
57 HERZ, supra note 30, at 251.
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ability regarding the scope and application of the Chapter, it nevertheless
represents the fact that an effects-based test does not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, it serves as a helpful tool for a tribunal or panel faced with a claim-
ant who has suffered a loss but retains title in and possession of his or her
property.
2. Is an Intention to Expropriate Determinative?
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to determine whether, in order
to establish a compensable injury, a State must first, directly or indirectly,
"intend" to expropriate property.
It is a well settled principle of international law that a State is not re-
quired to evince an intention to expropriate property in order for a tribunal
to find the existence of an expropriation.5 9 There are a number of practical
reasons militating against a tribunal undergoing such an examination.
5SAlthough the effects-based test is helpful, it is not alone sufficient for considering ex-
propriations. For example, it does not provide any guidance for measuring the requisite level
of interference necessary for establishing a taking. It leaves open questions such as whether
the degree of effect should be measured as a percentage of one's total property or on a
minimum quantity basis. Alternatively, it may be possible to sever negatively impacted
property so that a measure only be considered in respect of that portion of an adversely im-
pacted parcel. Weston also notes that an effects-based test suffers from an inherent inequity
because it requires property owners who are negatively affected by a government's measure
which falls below an imaginary line to suffer an injury for the benefit of society, while prop-
erty owners whose injury is above an imaginary line receive compensation equal to their to-
tal loss. Weston questions why some property owners are expected to personally suffer a
loss while the same demand is not made on others. See Weston, supra note 19, at 119. In
addition to these inherent inequities, it also runs the risk of encouraging inefficient measures
by government planners. For example, planners may become overly concerned with the ef-
fect that a measure has on others rather than being concerned with its particular merits.
Furthermore, barring other considerations, provided that a measure does not go "too far",
there would be little economic incentive to create a prudent or efficient program. Finally, it
does not incorporate the police power exception. While helpful, an effects-based test cer-
tainly does not represent a complete approach for determining when a measure amounts to a
taking.59As noted, in both Polish Upper Silesia and Norwegian Shipowners' Claims, liability
was predicated on the effect of the Respondent's actions on the Claimant's property, and not
whether the Respondent intended to expropriate the subject property in its entirety. Case
Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7.;
Norwegian Shipowners' Claims (Norway v. U.S.) I R.I.A.A. 307 (1922). Christie states, for
example, that:
The Norwegian Claims and the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases show that a State may
expropriate property, where it interferes with it, even though the State expressly disclaims any such
intention. More important, the two cases taken together illustrate that even though a State may not
purport to interfere with rights to property, it may, by its actions, render those rights so useless that it
will be deemed to have expropriated them.
Christie, supra note 16, at 311
Similarly, except in a few limited cases, such as Harza and Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has overwhelmingly rejected an in-
tentions-based test. Harza Eng'g Coy. Gov't of the Islamic of Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S.
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To begin, it is extremely difficult and complex, if not impossible, for a
tribunal to enter into an examination of whether a particular law, policy or
program was, in fact, intended to expropriate a property owner's interests in
his or her property.60 Sir John Fischer Williams, who argued that expro-
priations only provide a limited right to compensation, argued against tribu-
nals investigating into a government's underlying motives, as follows:
The motives of individuals are often difficult enough to determine by legal in-
quiry, but such an inquiry is surely both impracticable and impertinent in the
case of a state... It is surely fantastic to suppose that states would expressly or
implicitly consent, or that there now exists any international law requiring
them, to submit to such an inquisition as to domestic legislation passed by their
own legislatures and to agree that its validity is to depend on a foreign estimate
of the motives of statesmen, of legislatures, or of peoples.61
Additionally, it would be an affront to the principle of State sover-
eignty if, in the course of legislating, a State had to justify the intended ef-
fects of its measures. In any event, how could it be substantiated? As well,
even if it could be substantiated, there is no equitable reason why a property
owner should be treated differently on the basis of whether his or her host
government intended to take his or her property since the effect is the
same.62 An intentions-based test, therefore, is not appropriate for deter-
mining the existence of a taking.
3. Does a Public Purpose Exonerate a Government from Liability?
The next possible test for determining the existence of an expropria-
tion, or more pointedly, a compensable injury, is determining whether there
is a public purpose for the regulatory measure. Under this test, regardless
of the effect that a particular measure had on an investment, a State could
absolve itself from liability on the basis that a particular offending measure
Cl. Trib. Rep. 499 (1983); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1986). The seminal opinion in this regard was Panel Member Al-
drich's statement in Tippets, where he provided that "[t]he intent of the government is less
important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measure of
control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact." 6 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 219, 225-26 (1984).
This statement has been cited with approval in ITT Industries v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 225-226 (1983); Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 115 (1990); Sedco Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co., 84 I.L.R. 483, 513 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1985).
'See WESTON, supra note 19, at 115.61 Sir John Filscher Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 1928 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1,26.62On this point, Herz asserts, supra note 30, at 248, that:
In either case, whenever the criteria of expropriation are present, the act amounts to real expropria-
tion. Here, too, it is only the result which counts, and a state whose acts result in taking away for-
eign property may find itself involved even when acting bona fide and without any intention of
depriving anybody of his rights.
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was implemented for a public purpose. The difference in this example from
the one posited in the previous subsection is that in the former, compensa-
tion derives from the existence of a requisite intention which resulted in a
particular effect, whereas in this case compensation is linked to the purpose
of an expropriatory measure. For the reasons set out immediately below,
international law does not recognize a public purpose test as changing the
description of whether a measure constitutes an expropriation per se.
Conceptually, a public purpose exception would provide a State with
an almost infinite right to legislate without fear of any corresponding liabil-
ity. Viewed on its own, this may appear to be an appropriate method to
determine the existence of an expropriation. Depending on one's view of
property and government, however, it is a problematic solution to the tak-
ings issue (not to mention also being contrary to international law). If a
State was entitled to expropriate property without having to consider possi-
ble resulting liabilities, not only would it be a supremely unfair result for
property owners, but it would remove an important "check and balance" on
government power. States would be free to ignore the actual costs of their
measures.63 This would not be desirable from either an economics or equity
perspective.64
Wortley raises the following additional problem with a public purpose
exception: "The distinction between indirect loss resulting from reasonable
and general restrictions imposed in the social interest, and an indirect loss
amounting to a mere smoke-screen for the taking of an asset, is a real
one."
65
It would be far too easy for a government to justify its incursion on
private property as being for a public purpose. In essence, it would destroy
the actual, underlying tenets of private property rights. As well, such a
definition would be functionally irrelevant since, by definition, a govern-
ment always legislates or regulates in furtherance of a public purpose. A
test based entirely on public purpose, therefore, would not be practical.
While a straight public purpose test for determining the existence of an
expropriation, and thus a compensable injury, must be rejected, it is impor-
tant not to confuse a public purpose exception from the police power or
noxious use66 exception.
63In other words, it allows governments to treat as free what otherwise has a market
value (i.e., a person's property). Hence, the true costs of a measure, from a welfare perspec-
tive, are lost.
6In Agins v. City of Tiburon, for example, the United States Supreme Court noted that
"[t]he determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determi-
nation that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise
of state power in the public interest." 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)65 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 51.
"This latter term is generally restricted to the municipal Iawfora.
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Although the exact nature and scope of the police power exception is
discussed infra, briefly, the Restatement Third of the Law67 provides that
"[a] state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic injury
that is due to bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or
other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police
power of states.. ." International law recognizes that certain interferences
by a government on property rights will not entail a right to compensation.
The main difficulty with establishing a public purpose exception, and thus
the prime reason for the police power exception, is the tremendous breadth
traditionally given to the former term.68 Although any measure in further-
ance of a public purpose is seemingly important, the police power exception
acts as a necessary limitation on a State's right to encroach upon private
property rights without the fear of having to compensate adversely im-
pacted property owners.69
In Pope & Talbot, for example, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal rejected
Canada's assertion that because the measure in question (i.e., an export
control) was enacted through regulation and was not otherwise discrimina-
tory, it could not amount to an expropriation on the basis that it was a valid
exercise of its powers.70 Citing the Third Restatement of the Law favoura-
bly, NAFTA Tribunal rejected Canada's argument as going "too far," not-
ing that if regulatory measures were excluded from the scope of Article
1110 "much creeping expropriation could be conducted by regulation, and a
blanket exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole
in international protections against expropriation.', 7'
The existence of a valid public purpose, therefore, is not a sufficient
excuse for failing to compensate an alien property owner.72 Instead, tribu-
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §712g (1987).
68This should not be interpreted as implying that the determination of whether a measure
falls under the police power exception is clear or certain.
Again it is very difficult to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and that of police power, especially since states have more and more abandoned the
laissez-faire conception of their functions and become "welfare" state interfering daily in all imagin-
able realms of private activities by all imaginable measures and procedures. It may be often difficult
to ascertain whether such interference is one which is necessary to protect the public against a direct
danger threatening its safety or one which refers to public utility only.
Herz, supra note 30, at 252.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, he later concludes "in spite of difficulties of demarcation,
the distinction between measures of police and expropriation for pubic utility is one of posi-
tive international law, recognized by state practice as well as by almost unanimous opinion
of theorists." Id.
69However, even here compensation may be required if, in Justice Holmes' words, the
measure "goes too far."
7OPope & Talbot, supra note 5, at para.99.71id.
72For example, in the De Garmendia Case, the Government of Venezuela destroyed the
Claimant's wooden building so that space could be left open to view the port. De Garmen-
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nals have treated the existence of a public purpose as a condition precedent
for establishing a lawful expropriation, rather than as an excusing condition.
In Amoco International Finance Corporation, the Iran-U.S. Tribunal ex-
plained this principle stating that "[s]uch a property shall not be taken ex-
cept for a public purpose," the Treaty implies that an expropriation which is
justified by a public purpose may be lawful, which is precisely the rule of
customary international law.73
The above conclusion is confirmed by Article 111 0()(a) of the
NAFTA which provides that an expropriation or nationalization for which
compensation is owed, must be for a public purpose. Thus, under Arti-
cle 1110 of the NAFTA, a public purpose objective is a necessary require-
ment for any expropriation in the same manner as is non-discriminatory
treatment and the payment of compensation. A public purpose test, there-
fore, is a necessary condition rather than as an excusing factor. A public
purpose test alone does not reveal the existence of an expropriation.
4. Form of a Measure
The next possible point of inquiry as to whether a measure constitutes
an expropriation is to consider the form of the measure. In this sense, it
dia Case, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903 10, 13 (1903). Despite the Venezuelan gov-
ernment's plea that action was "necessary as an act of public utility", Commissioner Bain-
bridge awarded damages to the Claimant. Similarly, in Phelps Dodge Corp., the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal found that while the particular law and actions taken by the Iranian Gov-
ernment may very well have been premised on legitimate objectives, namely the protection
of workers, the Government was nevertheless liable to the Claimant Phelps Dodge Corp., 10
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121, 130 (1986).
The Tribunal fully understands the reasons why the Respondent felt compelled to protect its interests
through this transfer of management, and the Tribunal understands the financial, economic and so-
cial concerns that inspired the law pursuant to which it was enacted, but those reasons and concerns
cannot relieve the Respondent of the obligation to compensate Phelps Dodge for its loss.
Id.
Finally, in United States v. Republic of Panama (De Sabla case), the Government of Pan-
ama, in the course of establishing a comprehensive land program, transferred some private
land holdings which it considered baldio to other private citizens. United States v. Republic
of Panama (De Sabla case), reprinted in 28 AMER. J. INT'L L. 602, 611-612 (1933). As a re-
sult of these measures, the Claimant lost 1,362 hectares of its land to outright grants and an-
other 1,818 hectares of land to the Government's issuance of temporary licence. Once again,
despite the Government's plea that the measures were necessary, the Commission held that:
It is axiomatic that acts of a government in depriving an alien of his property without compensation
impose international responsibility ... As the public statements of its high officials show, it was en-
deavoring throughout this period to bring order out of a chaotic system of public land administration.
In such a period of development and readjustment, it is perhaps inevitable that unfortunate situations
like the present one should arise. It is no extreme measure to hold, as this Commission does, that if
the process of working out the system results in the loss of private property of aliens, such loss
should be compensated.
Id.
73Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 189, 223 (1987).
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may be possible to define an expropriation on the basis of how a loss oc-
curs, rather than the mere fact that there has been a loss of use or enjoyment
of property.
There certainly is not universal acceptance of this approach. For ex-
ample, Friedman, rejecting this as a means by which to determine the exis-
tence of an expropriation, stated that:
International law does not prescribe in an imperative manner the particular
form which a measure of expropriation must assume. For an international
judge, it is immaterial whether the measure in question is the consequence of a
law or a decree. In the eyes of the international judge, laws, decrees or judicial
decisions are mere facts, which he must appraise in an independent capacity.7
Notwithstanding Friedman's explanation above, an examination of
both case law and authoritative writings demonstrates that the form of an
impugned measure often plays a role in revealing the existence of a taking.
Tribunals have been more likely to find a taking in certain circumstances
than in others.75 In this sense, while the form of a measure is not, in and of
itself, determinative of a taking, it is a predicative tool. In the sub-
subsections that follow, various forms of measures are considered with a
view to determining the likelihood that, if implemented, they would be con-
sidered expropriatory if they significantly deprived a property owner the use
or enjoyment of his or her property. In particular, the following types of
measures are considered: legislative and regulatory measures, land control
and conservation measures, government-appointed managers and directors,
tax measures, and currency-related regulations.
The treatment given to these measures by previous panels, although not
binding, may help predict how a panel struck under the NAFTA would
view a similar measure. This can then be related back to the more narrow
issue of the impact of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA on the ability of the
NAFTA Parties to enact environmental and forest conservation measures.
(a) General Legislative and Regulatory Measures
A State has a fundamental right to legislate for its own benefit.
Through legislation a State can establish, inter alia, its monetary and fiscal
regime, its programs and policies concerning health, welfare and the envi-
ronment, and its criminal justice system. While the power to legislate and
74S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 136 (1953).75For example, the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property,
(adopted by the OECD Council on 12 October, 1967), provides that the following may lead
to an inference of a taking: "excessive or arbitrary taxation; prohibition of dividend distribu-
tion coupled with compulsory loans; imposition of administrators; prohibition of dismissal of
staff; refusal of access to raw materials or of essential export or import licences." OECD
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, reprinted in 2 INT'L LAw. 331, 338
(1967). Presumably, a list such as this one could not be created unless there was some con-
sistency in the manner by which tribunals viewed certain measures over others.
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regulate is inherently internal and municipal, States exist in a large global
community and, in that capacity, their laws, programs and conduct are held
up against, and are subject to, international law and legal requirements. In
the Norwegian Loans case, Sir Lauterpacht provided the following remarks
in obiter concerning Norway's contention that the International Court of
Justice was not competent to consider its national regulations:
National legislation-including currency legislation-may be contrary, in its
intention or effects, to the international obligations of the State. The question
of conformity of national legislation with international law is a matter of inter-
national law. The notion that if a matter is governed by national law it is for
that reason at the same time outside the sphere of international law is both
novel and, if accepted, subversive of international law. It is not enough for a
State to bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its legislation, possibly
of a predatory character, in order to shelter it effectively from any control by
international law.76
Accordingly, the fact that a State implements a domestic regulation in
accordance with its constitutional powers does not negate its review pursu-
ant to international law. Indeed, in the context of the NAFTA, the tribunal
in DESONA clearly held that a Party's (in that case, Mexico's) laws and
legislative system must be consistent with general principles of interna-
tional law. 77 Similarly, as noted, in Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA arbitral tri-
bunal explicitly acknowledged that regulatory measures may be covered
under Article 1110 of the NAFTA.
Legislation and regulatory measures can result in a taking either
through a single formal measure, or through a number of discreet measures
which, when aggregated, have the same practical effect as does the single
formal measure. In terms of a formal taking, it occurs when an acquired or
vested right is expunged.78 For example, a direct taking can occur through
legislation which either cancels or is contrary to a right granted under a
76Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). Norway argued that, on the basis of reciprocity, it could in-
voke France's reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court whereby under the French Decla-
ration of Acceptance the Court was precluded from considering "matters which are
essentially within the national jurisdiction, as understood by the Government of the French
Republic." Id. Sir Lauterpacht's comments have since been cited with approval on a num-
ber of occasions. See F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPEcT OF MoNEY 468 (1992); Kenneth S.
Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AMER. J. INT'L L. 260, 275
(1958); Mobil Oil Iran Inc., v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 3, 25 (1987).
nRobert Azinian, Kenneth Davitan & Ellen Baw v. United Mexican States, 14 ICSID
Rev.-FILJ para. 97 (1999); see also NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1105.78The Canadian Federal Government has employed this method on a number of occa-
sions. For example, Canada's former National Energy Program (NEP) has already been
mentioned in this regard. Another example is Bill C-22, Pearson International Airport
Agreements Act, which expunged various long-term lease agreements to re-develop two ter-
minals at Toronto's Lester B. Pearson Airport.
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concession or license to a private individual or company. Gillian White as-
serts that "the effect of the nationalisation measure on the concession is to
bring it to an end before the agreed date and to transfer the right of carrying
on the particular activity from the concessionaire to the nationalising
State."79 Such measures can be particularly severe to a concessionaire or
licensee who has devoted a considerable amount of time and resources to
developing the infrastructure necessary in order to gain the benefits under
its expropriated concession. 80 For this reason, legislation purporting to di-
rectly expropriate proprietary interests has generally been held by interna-
tional tribunals and courts as invoking State responsibility.
A separate and, possibly, more contentious issue arises where a legis-
lative or regulatory measure has a significant impact on the ability of prop-
erty holders to use or enjoy their property. On the one hand, a government
cannot be held hostage every time that its measures have a negative eco-
nomic impact on foreign owners' property, while on the other hand, the im-
pact that legislation can have on property owners can be just as severe in
effect as is a formal taking.
Borrowing from both the reasonableness and effects-based tests de-
scribed above, international law recognizes that a deprivation of rights and
use of property may result in a taking.8' This is precisely the nature of the
79 GILLIAN WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 162 (1961). While it is true
that many nationalizations have been inspired by governments attempting to take over and
operate their foreign-held concessions (e.g., the numerous nationalization programs under-
taken by a number of Arab States during the 1960s and 1970s concerning foreign-held oil
concessions), there also have been instances where governments have expropriated rights by
offering the rights held concessionaires, in whole or in part, to third parties. For example, in
In the Matter ofthe Arbitration Between Valentine Petroleum & Chemical Corp. and Agency
for Intl IDev., an arbitral tribunal, pursuant to an OPIC Contract of Guaranty, found that the
Government of Haiti had expropriated the Claimant's interests by annulling the Claimant's
ten year oil exploration permit in favour of a third party. In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between Valentine Petroleum & Chemical Corp. and Agency for Int'l Dev., 9 I.L.M. 889
(1970). Similarly, in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), an arbitral tri-
bunal found that a taking had occurred on the basis that part of the Claimant's concessionary
rights had been annulled in favour of a third party transportation company. 27 I.L.R. 117
(Arbit. Trib. 1958). In both cases, compensation was awarded to the injured alien conces-
sionaire.
so See Vance R. Koven, Expropriation and the "Jurisprudence" of OPIC, 22 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 269, 294 (1981); see also Shufeldt Claim (Guatemala v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1079, 1095
(1930), (where the Arbitrator placed considerable weight on the fact that the concessionaire
had invested a significant amount of money on the good faith of the Guatemalan Govern-
ment).
81 In Starrett Hous. Corp., where, despite the Respondent's contention that certain meas-
ures where necessary for, inter alia, safeguarding purchasers and protecting workers against
being laid-off work, the Tribunal found that the Claimant had lost "effective use, control and
benefits" of its property and was, therefore, entitled to compensation. Starrett Hous. Corp. v.
Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 122, 144 (1983). Similarly,
in Sedco, Inc. v. Nat 7 Iranian Oil Co., the Tribunal held that legislation purporting to be in
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claim successfully made by the Claimant in Metalclad. In Metalclad, for
example, while the Claimant retained title in its property, the denial of a
construction permit by the local government resulted in the Claimant effec-
tively losing all benefits of ownership since it could not operate a landfill,
notwithstanding that it had been given the necessary permits for that pur-
pose from the federal government of Mexico.
Finally, while legislative measures may, if sufficiently severe, result in
an expropriation, a compensable injury generally does not arise until the
host government actually exercises its authority under such legislation. For
example, where a government merely passes a law that could, if exercised,
have an expropriatory effect, until the power is actually exercised, it gener-
ally is not considered to amount to a compensable injury. The fact that a
venerable cloud hovers over property does not, in and of itself, establish a
taking. There must be some definitive evidence to establish that the depri-
vation has crystallized.
In Mariposa Development, for example, the Commission noted that:
Practical common sense indicates that the mere passage of an act under which
private property may later be expropriated without compensation by judicial or
executive action should not at once create an international claim on behalf of
every alien property holder in the country ... claims should arise only when
actual confiscation follows. 82
The reasoning in Mariposa Development has been followed in a num-
ber of cases before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
3
In Malek, for example, the Tribunal held that the mere fact that legis-
lation applies prospectively to effect property rights does not in itself
amount to an expropriation. Rather, there must be some evidence that a
government has begun to exercise its rights:
It follows from the language of the provision [Article 989] that the Article is
not self-executing but that a procedure for the sale of the real estate must be set
in motion under the supervision of the local Public Prosecutor, The Claimant,
however, has not submitted any evidence purporting to prove that this proce-
dure was ever implemented in relation to the Farmland between 5 November
1980 and 19 January 1981. "
The mere enactment of legislation that may or may not at some future
date lead to an expropriation will not be enough to substantiate a claim.
Only where the rights or powers under the impugned legislation are exer-
respect of insolvency measures was in fact expropriatory. Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co., 10 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 180 (1986) (interlocutory award).
82Mariposa Development Co. v. U. S. -Panama Claims Commission, 7. I.L.R. 255, 257
(1933).83 See, e.g., The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case (Greek Republic v. Great
Britain), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No. 5 (Mar. 26).
4Reza Said Malek v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
246, 267 (1996).
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cised will it generally be evaluated as to whether it amounts to a compensa-
ble injury on the basis of an expropriation.
(b) Land Control and Conservation Measures
A second way that governments can impose controls or restrictions on
the use of property is through zoning and land-use planning measures. Ac-
cording to Professor Eric Todd, "[b]y the imposition, removal or alteration
of land use controls a public authority may dramatically increase, or de-
crease, the value of land by changing the permitted uses which may be
made of it.,85 For example, a government may designate, or zone, a par-
ticular region for a particular use, such as industrial, commercial, residential
or agricultural. Through zoning measures and the like, governments can di-
rect how land will be used, and, relatedly, how it will not be used. Gener-
ally speaking, while land-use and zoning measures can have a tremendous
impact on the value of property, governments are, for the most part, not re-
sponsible for compensating those property owners who are impacted by
such measures. In this respect, (former) Canadian Supreme Court Justice
Estey noted that "[o]rdinarily, in this country, the United States and the
United Kingdom, compensation does not follow zoning either up or
down. 86 This inherently recognizes that certain costs naturally accompany
ownership rights. Unfortunately, there are very few international law cases
which have considered zoning and land-use planning issues.87 As a result,
it is difficult to derive common principles under international law.
8 5ERIc C.E. TODD, THE LAW OF ExPROPRIATION AND COMPENSAION IN CANADA 22
(1992).
86The Queen (B.C.) v. Tener, I S.C.R. 533, 557 (1985). However, tracing the historical
roots of the relationship between zoning and police powers, Hippler provides that:
Zoning had rapidly developed as a tool for municipalities to restrict and control urban growth. It
was clear that the power to zone was desirable, if not necessary, to regulate the interrelationship of
property interests in urban communities. As an exercise of police power, however, zoning had little
justification in terms ofjudicial precedent. Specifically, zoning went well beyond previously sanc-
tioned police power prohibitions of nuisances. Indeed, its function was to prevent situations which
could result in future nuisances. In addition, zoning often involved significant diminution in value of
private property when it allowed only a residential or other use of limited profitability.
Thomas A. Hippler, Re-examining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking Doctrine:
The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of Advantage," and "Bundle of
Rights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 653, 688
(1986).87One international law case which directly involves a conservation measure is In the
Matter of Arbitration between Int'l Bank and Overseas Private Inv. Corp. 11 I.L.M. 1216
(1972). In that case, the impugned measure was a forest conservation measure enacted by
the Government of the Dominican Republic. The Claimant, a lumber mill operator, alleged
that as a result of the conservation measures it was forced to cease production which, ac-
cording to the Claimant, amounted to an expropriation. The Tribunal disagreed, instead
finding for the Respondent Government.
On the surface, the case appears to establish the proposition that a government may es-
tablish a conservation measure free from the threat of expropriation. Upon closer review,
however, the case will likely not stand up to future judicial consideration for the following
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The best example of how international law may treat future land-use
and zoning regulations, and a limited one at that, involves two cases de-
cided by the European Court of Human Rights ("European Court"). 88
The first case, Sporrong and Lonnroth, involved two separate claims
which arose pursuant to legislation enacted by the Stockholm City Council
as part of its attempt to redevelop the Lower Norrmalm district.89 The
Plaintiffs claimed that the legislation, which created certain expropriation
permits and use restrictions over an extended period of time, had such a
reasons: the case was determined pursuant to an Overseas Private Investment Corporation
insurance contract; the legislation did not bar the cutting of almacigo timber which was the
only type used by the Claimant; the Claimant's operation was losing a substantial amount of
money prior to the enactment of the conservation measures; and the Government did every-
thing in its power to accommodate the Claimant's special needs. Finally, the Tribunal noted
that even valid environmental legislation may go too far and amount to an expropriation. In
the end, Int'l Bank does not provide much guidance.
88Both cases were raised pursuant to Article I of the First Protocol of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights which provides that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by general principles of intemational law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, reprinted in EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTs:
COLLECTED TExTs 40 (Council of Europe 1994).
The precedential value of cases heard by the European Court is questionable. On the one
hand, Rudolf Dolzer and the majority opinion in Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Gov't of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, refer favourably to the European Court's decision in the Sporrong
and Lonnroth case, discussed infra. See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien
Property, 1 ICSID REnvEw: FOREIGN INVEsTmENT L. J. 41, 46 (1986); Foremost Tehran, Inc.
v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228, 251 (1986). On the
other hand, Justice Holtzmann, dissenting in Foremost Tehran, argued against conferring
any weight to the decisions of the European Court. Foremost Tehran, 10 Iran U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. at 267
89 Sporrong and Lonnroth Case, 68 I.L.R. 86 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1982). The legislation at is-
sue here created expropriation permits, which allowed the Council to name areas susceptible
to future expropriation, as well as general measures allowing the legislature to prohibit con-
struction and property improvements in certain named areas. The legislation did not, how-
ever, restrict an owner's right to sell, mortgage or let its property. The first claim was raised
by the Sporrong estate. On 31 July 1956, an expropriation permit was issued against the es-
tate property. It was subsequently renewed three times, eventually expiring on 3 May 1979.
As well, between July 1954 and July 1979, the City Council imposed a prohibition against
any construction on property within the zone. The permits and prohibition were issued in
order that the City could construct a viaduct. The second claim was raised by Ms. Lonnroth
whose property was subject to both an expropriation permit and construction prohibition for
eight and twelve years, respectively. While the first Plaintiff never attempted to sell its
property, Ms. Lonnroth complained that the legislation had deterred a potential purchaser
and resulted in her being unable to secure a loan by using the property's mortgages as collat-
eral. Id.
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negative impact on their use and enjoyment of their property that it gave
rise to a compensable injury on the basis that it amounted to an expropria-
tion. Ten votes to nine, the European Court agreed with the Plaintiffs.
Adopting an effects-based test,90 the Court explained that while the legisla-
tion did not formally expropriate the Plaintiffs' property, it ultimately had
the same effect. While the property owners were permitted to sell, mort-
gage and let their property, the Court explained that the impugned measure:
[N]evertheless in practice significantly reduced the possibility of its exercise.
They also affected the very substance of ownership in that they recognised be-
fore the event that any expropriation would be lawful and authorised the City
of Stockholm to expropriate whenever it found it expedient to do so. The ap-
plicants' right of property thus became precarious and defeasible. 91
Although not stating so directly, it would appear that the European
Court's decision was influenced by both the length of time which the legis-
lation applied, as well as the nature of the restrictions.92
On its own, the decision in Sporrong and Lonnroth may shed light on
whether a zoning measure can amount to an expropriation. However, its
value in establishing a precedent is questionable as a result of the European
Court's contrary decision in James and Others.93 In James and Others, the
European Court was asked to determine whether legislation requiring cer-
tain property owners to let or sell their property at prices below market
value constituted an expropriation.94 As a result of the legislation, the
Plaintiff was forced to sell eighty of its approximately two thousand homes,
resulting in losses totalling over two million pounds. This time, and in
marked contrast to its decision in Sporrong and Lonnroth, the Court found
against the Claimant on the basis that the legislation did not have an expro-
priatory effect. In the end, the European Court held that the legislation rep-
resented a valid incursion on private property rights.
90In other words, the Court explained its role as follows: In absence of a formal expro-
priation, that is to say a transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it must look behind
the appearances and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. See id. atl06.
91See id. at 105.
92This reasoning is seemingly at odds with the decisions in both Mariposa, and Malek,
where the courts held that legislation which acts prospectively does not amount to an expro-
priation until the restrictions under it are actually executed. Mariposa Development Co. v.
U. S. -Panama Claims Commission, 7. I.L.R. 255, 257 (1933); Reza Said Malek v. Gov't of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 246,286 (1996)
93In Re James and Others, 75 I.L.R. 396 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 1986).94In this case, the United Kingdom Parliament passed legislation, the Leasehold Reform
Act, which was intended to create opportunities for private citizens to purchase property.
The traditional long-term leasing practices had been such that lessors were often required, as
a condition of obtaining a lease, to construct a building or a home on their leased property.
Upon termination of the lease period, both the land and the improvements would revert back.
According to the legislation, long-term lessors could either opt for a twenty-five year lease
extension or purchase their rented property. In either case, the rental or selling rate was set
equal to the value of the land without any buildings or improvements. See id.
276
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It is difficult to evoke common principles from either case. While it is
clear that a zoning measure may amount to an expropriation where it goes
"too far," the demarcation line remains uncertain.
Finally, it also should be noted that an expropriation may exist in less
obvious settings. For example, in Seismograph Service Corporation,95 the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal found in favor of the Claimant after the Iranian
government had failed to issue it the necessary permits for re-exporting its
equipment from Iran.96 Similarly, in Petrolane, the Tribunal held that:
Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal finds that by preventing the Claimant
from exporting its Service Plant, NIOC deprived the Claimant of the effective
use, benefit and control of the equipment listed on the April and June RTEs in
breach of contract, as well as constituting an expropriation...97
The Iranian Government was thus held responsible for failing to pro-
vide the necessary approvals despite the fact there was no evidence of any
official policy or plan to expropriate the Claimant's property. Rather, the
Tribunal held the Government liable on the basis of the effect of its omis-
sion on the Claimant.
(c) Government Appointed Managers and Directors
The next measure examined pertains to a situation where a host gov-
ernment assumes control, directly or indirectly, over a corporation, entity or
proprietary right. Traditionally, this occurs in situations where a govern-
ment attempts to limit or remove foreign ownership or involvement in or
from a particular sector of the economy. Alternatively, it can refer to in-
stances where a government takes over a company on the brink of bank-
ruptcy or where it is violating the terms of its license or permit
requirements. For example, in the context of environmental legislation, it
may, depending on the terms of the empowering legislation, include a
situation where a forest or mining company is acting in a manner that is
(grossly) contrary to the terms of its license or permit.
The simple act of a government appointing a manager, liquidator or of-
ficial to assume temporary control over a company is generally not suffi-
cient for establishing an expropriation.98  Rather, something more
95Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 22 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 3 (1988).
96The Tribunal restricted its finding to include only the equipment which the Claimant
took positive steps to re-export. See Houston Contracting Company v. Nat'l Oil Co., 20
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1988), where a similar decision was rendered by the Tribunal
earlier in 1988.97Petrolane, Inc. v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64,
96(1991).
98See Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15
(July 20); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Gov't of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 153 (1987); Motorola, Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 73 (1988). In the latter case, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal found against the Claimant
despite the fact that the Claimant's manager was arrested and the Government's appointed
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substantial, such as failing to treat an alien as a rightful owner, is required.
In this respect, Weston provides that:
Once again, then, one is left to conclude that the "State administration" of pri-
vate wealth is by itself to be regarded not as a compensable event but as a tem-
porary custodial action not amounting to a "constructive taking." Only when
such measures are determined to be truly non-custodial in character, or, alter-
natively, when they are determined to be part of an ultimately definitive dis-
possession-such as would transfer title or otherwise conclusively deprive an
owner of the yield therefrom-is the appointment and subsequent functioning
of a State administrator regarded as the equivalent of a "direct taking."99
Generally, a tribunal or arbitral panel will look to see whether a claim-
ant has been denied the benefits of ownership. Such benefits include the
power to designate directors, be involved in major decisions (including the
purchase or sale of substantial levels of equipment or inventory), receive
dividends which are provided to shareholders within the same class, and
make major planning and executive decisions (including whether to merge
or acquire new companies or dissolve existing ones).1°° A mere temporary
restriction on some of these rights likely will not result in a compensable
injury. Rather, only where a measure is permanent or where its effect is
particularly incursive or draconian will a tribunal find the existence of an
expropriation.
(d) Confiscatory Taxation
International law is generally indifferent towards how a state taxes it
residents, such as, for example, an income tax, consumption tax, or a manu-
facturing tax, or how a State spends its tax revenues. By virtue of an alien's
decision to reside in a particular country, the alien is generally deemed to
accept the fiscal measures and legislative system of its host state, provided,
of course, that such measures or system otherwise does not violate mini-
mum standards of treatment under international law. For the most part,
therefore, aliens must accept their tax obligations in the same manner as do
the nationals of their host State.
In Brewer, Moller & Co. Case, for example, a German national com-
pany which was residing in Venezuela was ordered to pay the taxes that it
manager, Mr. Tahanha, was elevated from temporary to general manager. The Tribunal,
however, found against an expropriation since Mr. Tahanha had invited the Claimant to par-
ticipate in the management of the company. Judge Brower, dissenting, complained that the
majority "could not have constructed a purer fairy tale out of plain facts." See Motorola, Inc.
v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 95.
99WESTON, supra note 19, at 165.
1'°In Phelps Dodge Corp., the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal further noted that where a gov-
ernment assumes control over property or a right owned by a private individual, the govern-
ment owes a fiduciary responsibility to that individual. Phelps Dodge Corp., 10 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986).
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owed its host State notwithstanding its objections otherwise. 10 The for-
eigner was deemed to have assumed the everyday costs and risks associated
with entry into a foreign jurisdiction. 10 2
Municipal taxation measures are not, however, free from international
legal disciplines. Albrecht notes that just like with anything else, taxation
laws must be held up to international legal standards when an alien locates
to a foreign State. °1 The issue for this paper is whether taxes that are so
onerous and effectively deprive a property owner of the use or enjoyment of
his or her property could amount to an expropriation, thus giving rise to
state responsibility.
An onerous taxation rate can have the same practical effect on a prop-
erty owner as does any expropriatory measure. In order to pay a tax, for
example, a property owner may be forced to relinquish a substantial portion
of his or her property. Yet, tribunals and courts generally have not viewed
taxation in this manner. Wortley notes that the hesitancy against finding a
taxation measure to be expropriatory results from the fact that:
A State is presumed to exist for the common good, and therefore, as the object
of taxation is to meet the expenses of the State in peace and war, taxation may
be presumed to be a lawful act of sovereignty when it takes place in respect of
property within the sovereign's territory.
104
In Kugele, the claimant, a former owner of a brewery, alleged that be-
cause of increasingly high license fees his business was rendered unprofit-
able and, as a result, he was forced to exit the market.10 5 Although not
formally pled, the claimant alleged that Poland's taxation measures
amounted to an indirect expropriation. President Kaeckenbeeck of the Up-
per Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, finding in favour of the Respondent Gov-
ernment, viewed the matter differently:
The increase of the license fees was not itself capable of taking away or im-
pairing the rights of the plaintiff... The increase of the tax cannot be regarded
as a taking away or impairment of the right to engage in a trade, for such taxa-
tion presupposes the engaging in the trade. It is true that taxation may render
the trade less remunerative or altogether unremunerative. However, there is an
essential difference between the maintenance of a certain rate of profit in an
undertaking and the legal and factual possibility of continuing the undertaking.
1o1 See Brewer, Moller & Co. Case (Ger. v. Ven.), 10 R.I.A.A. 423 (1903).
102Roland R. Foulke properly notes that "[i]t seems clear that if he goes to a state, lives
therein and reaps the benefit of that state's political organization, he should be called on to
pay the same share of the expense of running that organization as other persons who are
within the state." ROLAND R. FOULKE, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II, 24
(1920).
10 3 See A. R Albrecht, The Taxation ofAliens Under International Law, 1952 BarT. Y.B.
INr'L L. 145.
1°4WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 46.
10SKugele v. Poland (Germany v. Poland), 6 Ann. Dig. 69 (Upper Silesian Arbit. Trib.
1932).
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The trader may feel compelled to close his business because of the new tax...
But this does not mean that he has lost the right to engage in the trade. For had
he paid the tax, he would be entitled to go on with his business.
106
However, despite the fact that Kugele has been cited with approval on
a number of occasions,10 7 this must be treated circumspectly. It appears that
the arbitral tribunal neglected to consider whether the claimant's rights were
merely naked and, by the time the government's fees were imposed, no
longer subsisting. The case report is scanty in this regard.
The extreme deference given to taxation measures is likely attributable
to the fact that it is often confused with the police power exception.108 Tri-
bunals have commonly held that taxation measures, because they are neces-
sary to the functioning of a State, are (virtually) beyond inquiry. In so
doing, tribunals have relied upon the police power nature of such measures
in order to absolve a State from liability. As a result, taxation measures
have been mostly shielded from expropriation claims.
Additionally, some jurists have argued that a tax measure can only
constitute an expropriation where applied in a discriminatory manner. For
example, Friedman asserts that "[ilt is, in fact, very widely admitted that a
diplomatic claim 'would be inadmissible in respect of the imposition and
collection of a tax affecting nationals and foreigners indiscriminately.'" 109
1 61d. at 69.
107For example, Judge Lagregren cited it with approval in Sedco Inc., v. Nat'lIranian Oil
Co., while in the Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), the Permanent Court of
International Justice employed similar reasoning. Sedco Inc., v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 84
I.L.R. 483, 513 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 1985); Oscar Chinn Case (United Kingdom v.
Belgium), 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63 (Dec. 12). Furthermore, it was noted with (seem-
ing) approval by the American Law Institute's influential Third Restatement of the Law.
Third Restatement of the Law, supra note 67, at 211 (Reporters' Notes). However, in para-
graph 712, the Restatement holds that a tax measure may be a taking where either it is "con-
fiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective
enjoyment of an alien's property or its removal from the state's territory... [or where it is]
discriminatory." See id.
1'0 Fachiri offers an alternative reason. According to him, a tax measure should be
treated separately from an expropriation because:
Generally speaking, taxation is distinguishable from expropriation amongst other things in this, that
the latter is in substance retroactive in its results, whereas the former is not. If the Govemment
seizes my land, or may savings in the bank, it deprives me, once for all, of pre-existing property,
without the possibility of my making good the loss. On the other hand, an income tax, death duties,
even a capital levy are prospective in operation, and provided that the rate is not too high, can be
balanced by saving and insurance (emphasis added).
Alexander P. Fachiri, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 1929 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L.
L. 32, 54 [hereinafter Fachiri].
However, since the discussion here is restricted to instances where the rate "is [not] too
high", the above statement, other than possibly explaining why the interference necessary for
finding a tax measure expropriatory should be more obvious than with other measures, is not
very helpful.
... FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 2.
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It is unclear, however, why a discrimination requirement should be im-
posed on taxation measures.10 There is no legitimate reason to adopt a dis-
crimination requirement on taxation measures (or currency regulations)
when it is not required for other forms of expropriation.'"
In light of the earlier discussion on public purpose, intentions, and ef-
fects, there is no legitimate reason why an excessively onerous taxation
measure should not be deemed a compensable injury." 2 The initial inquiry
should concern whether a measure is reasonable and whether its adverse
impact is more than ephemeral. This is not, however, how tribunals and
panels have traditionally approached taxation measures. Instead, the police
power exception, as well as the requirement of discriminatory treatment,
has been infsed into the determination of liability and, as a result, taxation
measures have been virtually excluded from the scope of expropriations.
(e) Currency-Related Measures
If abused, currency-related measures, including inflation, deflation,
transfer and/or exchange restrictions and monetary policies can have an ex-
"
0 Another reason against importing a discrimination requirement is that it essentially
eliminates lawful expropriations and nationalizations and only recognizes unlawful ones. It
will be remembered that a condition to having a lawful expropriation is that it be applied in a
non-discriminatory manner. Hence, if a condition of finding a tax measure expropriatory is
that it be applied in a discriminatory manner it also necessitates a finding of unlawfulness.
This in turn has serious repercussions on an offending State. In both The Case Concerning
the Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) and INA Corporation v. The Islamic Republic
of Iran, referring to the deplorable nature of a State acting unlawfully, damages were as-
sessed at the standard of restitution. The Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger-
many v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13; INA Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 8
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985). Accordingly, Judge Lagregren, in INA Corporation,
found that:
It is generally accepted that some types of expropriation are inherently unlawful - among these one
can cite cases in which foreign assets are taken on a discriminatory basis or for something other than
a public purpose. Here it is well settled that the measure of compensation out to be such as to ap-
proximate as closely as possible in monetary terms the principle ofrestitutio in integrum.
INA Corp., 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep., at 385.
"'Albrecht, also rejects the notion that a discrimination requirement should be de-
manded for takings arising through taxation measures. See Albrecht, supra note 103, at 172-
173. Accordingly, he provides that where a measure effects a taking, the type of measure
under which it occurs is irrelevant:
According to the doctrine of the sovereign right of taxation, and in the absence of special treaty pro-
visions, there would seem to be no basis in international law for objections to the exercise by a state
of its right to tax where there is no discrimination against aliens. As a general rule, this must be ad-
mitted. Nevertheless, an exception must be made in the case of confiscatory taxation, for it is a rule
of intemational law that confiscation, or expropriation without compensation, is illegal. There is lit-
tle difference in the practical effect of confiscation and confiscatory taxation. Surely, then, confis-
cation in the guise of taxation cannot be permitted when confiscation itself is prohibited.
Id.
12Indeed, Article 2103:6 of the NAFTA explicitly recognizes that a tax measure may be
expropriatory, although that Article creates procedural limitations on the ability to initiate a
claim on that basis under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103:6.
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propriatory effect on foreign property holders. However, like with taxation,
tribunals have accorded extreme deference to these types of policies. Once
again, except in obvious situations, and likely only where it is applied in a
discriminatory manner, aliens are faced with a difficult task where trying to
establish a State delinquency on the basis of a currency regulation.
According to general principles of international law, every State has
the sovereign right to establish and regulate its currency. 13 In most circum-
stances a State may determine without the scrutiny of the community of na-
tions whether, for example, to counter inflation, support its currency or
place limitations on exchange and foreign transfers. 14 While currency
regulation is a municipal and internal matter, like with taxation, it enters
into the realm of international law when an alien enters into commercial
relations with a foreign State.115 This may occur, for example, where an
alien places money in a foreign bank, retains foreign currency or in any
other manner which places an alien in the position of a creditor to a foreign
State. Furthermore, an alien is not required to actually reside in the debtor
State for that State to owe it an obligation pursuant to international law.
Most expropriatory measures involving currency policies have oc-
curred in the so-called lesser-income countries. 1 6 Generally speaking, cur-
rency-related claims arise out of situations where a country is attempting to
reorder and take control of its economy. 7 Except for certain comments
113See Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France
v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 20/21.
14 Dr. Mann, supra note 76, at 461, provides that:
Money, like tariffs or taxation or the admission of aliens, is one of these matters which prima facie
must be considered as falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States... Customary
international law does not normally fetter the municipal legislator's discretion in these matters or
characterize his measures as an intemational wrong for which he could be held responsible, just as it
leaves him the freedom to decide whether he wishes to introduce a particular type of tax and whether
he levies tax at a particular rate.
115Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (separate
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
116For example, in a peculiar twist, Rosenn chronicled how the extreme inflationary pe-
riod between the early-1950s to the mid-1960s in Brazil and Argentina allowed both States
to expropriate compensation awards gained through earlier expropriation proceedings. By
the time the Governments paid their compensation, particularly because the rate of inflation
exceeded interest rates given on such awards, the actual money a property owner received
for its taken property was nominal. Rosenn noted that the monetary policies of both coun-
tries "operated confiscatorily, and thus have severely strained the confidence of property
owners and investors in the promises of both governments to protect private investment."
Keith S. Rosenn, Expropriation, Inflation and Development, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 845, 847
(1972).
117 At the same time, it must not be lost that a State can manipulate its monetary policy in
such a way as to extract a supreme advantage over its creditors. For example, it can support
a program of devaluation in order to erase its debt. However, for an alien, the difficulty is in
substantiating his or her claim. Even if a purely effects-based test were applied, an alien
would still be faced with a difficult challenge in establishing both a loss of property and that
his or her loss was attributable to its host State. See EDwIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY
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made in dissent, which are discussed below, the case law has overwhelm-
ingly sided with respondent host States where an expropriation claim is
made on the basis of a currency policy.
The first hurdle to meet in establishing an expropriation claim arising
from a currency measure is in demonstrating a loss of property. It is diffi-
cult to conceptualize this form of taking. The problem lies in that there is
often not an accompanying direct loss. The losses are notional, and may
only apply for a temporary period. Furthermore, currency legislation is of-
ten applied in a very broad and general fashion. While the creditor of a host
state may very well receive the face value of his or her investment as at the
date of maturity, in actuality, the real value of his or her payment will have
severely declined.
Alternatively, a State may adopt a currency conversion regulation
which provides that aliens may not redeem their investments, or, if they can
redeem them, that the amount be reduced by a specified rate. For example,
in Eisner,18 a U.S. national alleged that her property was "taken" when,
following the liberation of Germany after the Second World War, the
American Military Commander in Berlin ordered that German Reichmarks
be converted into a "new" currency. Because the conversion rates were not
applied equally (e.g., residents of Germany received a better rate than did
aliens), the plaintiff asserted that such actions were expropriatory. In find-
ing against the plaintiff, the United States Court of Claims noted that when
dealing with currency conversion it is very difficult to even know whether
there has been a loss of real value." 9 Similarly, in French, despite the fact
that the claimant was not permitted to redeem his certificates worth
US$150,000 outside of Cuba, the New York Court of Appeals found that
the fact that "it is still his or his assignee's to enforce or attempt to enforce.
. ." demonstrates that it has not been taken.120 Hence, when raising an ex-
AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES Vol. 1 136 (1951), who noted that cur-
rency regulations can be used in an expropriatory manner. On the other hand, Wortley notes
that "when devaluation is a genuine defensive measure to counterbalance a disastrous fall in
prices, it is not abusive." Wortley, supra note 16, at 48.
"
8 Eisner v. United States, 1954 I.L.R. 476 (U.S. Ct. of Claims, 1954).
19A similar finding was reached in the Adam's Case where, though the facts were
slightly different, the Commissioners did not even consider the Claimant's case be a valid
one. Adam's Case (Great Britain v. United States), in 3 HISTORY AND DIGEST, MOORE
ARBITRATIONS 3066, 3067 (1898).
120French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 I.L.R. 6, 16 (N.Y. 1968). Essentially, the
Court adopted a direct physical invasion test whereby, as long as a property owner retains
title, even if it means that a property owner merely has the right to "bum" his or her property
(i.e., left valueless), then no action may be raised. In light of the very nature of an indirect
expropriation, this type of reasoning is not likely to be followed. Instead, the following mi-
nority opinion of Keating J. is more reflective of the present state of international law:
There is sufficient authority in international law for the proposition that a taking of property can oc-
cur without first depriving the owner of legal title if the foreigner is effectively deprived of all bene-
fit of the property ... Moreover, simply because Decision No. 346 was initially necessitated by
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propriation claim on the basis of fiscal policies or currency measures, a
claimant faces an initial formidable barrier in having to substantiate a loss.
Assuming that a loss can be established, as described above, the next
hurdle is to demonstrate that such loss is attributable to the debtor-State. In
French, Fuld C.J. asserted that:
This is not an era, surely, in which there is anything novel or internationally
reprehensible about even the most stringent regulation of national currencies
and the flow of foreign exchange. Such practices have been followed, as the
exigencies of international economics have required-and despite resulting
losses to individuals-by capitalist countries and communist countries alike,
by the United States and its allies as well as by those with whom or country
has had profound differences. They are practices which are not even of recent
origin but which have been recognized as a normal measure of government-for
hundreds of years, if not, indeed, as long-as currency has been used as the me-
dium of international exchange.1
2
'
As well, in the Furst Claim, the United States Foreign Claims Com-
mission held that a State cannot be held liable for fluctuations in its cur-
rency when attempting to bring order "in time of financial stress. 122
Thus, similar to taxation and other fiscal measures, international tribu-
nals are not likely to consider currency measures as amounting to an expro-
priation.
C. Measures Tantamount to an Expropriation
In addition to including direct and indirect expropriations, both of
which already have been canvassed above, Article 1110 imposes obliga-
tions on Parties for their "measures [which are] tantamount to" an expro-
priation and nationalization. The specific elements for establishing a
Cuba's need to protect its foreign exchange, it does not follow that it remains valid under interna-
tional law permanently.
Id. at 42.
Although stated in relation to the U.S.'s Fifth Amendment, similar reasoning to the above
was adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, where eventually finding for the U.S. Government on the basis of the po-
lice powers exception, the Court rejected the Respondent Government's contention that no
taking had occurred. 361 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1966). The plaintiff was denied the transfer
of its money out of the U.S., because "it has merely placed a temporary barrier to its transfer
outside the United States ... [the plaintiff may] ... use the account to pay customs duties,
taxes or fees owing to the United States, a state, or any instrumentality of either." Id. The
Court, in response to the above argument, noted that "we find it hard to say there is no depri-
vation when a man is prevented both from obtaining his property and from realizing any
benefit from it for a period of indefinite duration which may outrun his life." Id. at I11.
However, these cases effectively demonstrate the hesitancy which tribunals have had with
finding the existence of an expropriation out of a currency measure.
12tFrench, 66 I.L.R. at 19.
122Furst Claim, 42 I.L.R. 153, 154 (U.S. Foreign Cl. Comm'n, 1960).
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"measure tantamount to" a nationalization or expropriation are not specified
in the NAFTA. Appleton, for example, provides that:
The NAFTA does not include any definition of what constitutes an act tanta-
mount to expropriation. This is an area which is certain to receive attention
from future NAFTA dispute settlement panels as acts which are not considered
to constitute expropriation by the host state, but which impair the benefits of
NAFTA investors, may be subject to this NAFrA obligation.123
Although the phrase has not been judicially considered, phrases similar
to it have been included in other bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"). For
example, Article Ill of the United States' prototype investment treaty pro-
vides that: "Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either di-
rectly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or
nationalization."' 24
Similarly, in a BIT between Saint Lucia and the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Parties agreed that:
Investments by nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be
expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure the effects of
which would be tantamount to expopriation or nationalization in the territory
of the other Contracting Party...
As well, even Canada has implemented similar wording (arguably even
broader) in previous legislation to implement the 1988 Canada-US Free
Trade Agreement. Article 1605 of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act provided that:
Neither Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an invest-
ment in its territory by an investor of the other Party or take any measure or
series of measures tantamount to an expropriation of an investment.. ." (em-
phasis added).126
Although the phrase "measures tantamount to" is not defined by the
NAFTA, in Pope & Talbot the NAFTA arbitral tribunal interpreted it to ef-
fectively be the same as an indirect expropriation. This interpretation is
consistent with how some jurists have interpreted the phrase. For example,
Sandrino explained that:
Article 1110 of the NAFTA Investment Chapter provides for the protection of
foreign investments against nationalization, expropriation, and other forms of
123BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA - A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 86 (1994).
124 United States Prototype Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Pro-
tection of Investments (1984 revised text), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON
TRANsNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INvESTMENT TREATIES, ANNEx V (1988).
l25Article 4, Treaty Between Saint Lucia and the Federal Republic of Germany Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments of 16 March 1985, re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL
INvESTMENT TREATIES, ANNEX 11 (1988).
126 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988).
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interference that are "tantamount to nationalization or expropriation." The Ar-
ticle covers direct, indirect and "creeping expropriation."
'1 7
As well, in Metalclad, the U.S. Government explained that the phrase
"tantamount to expropriation" was not intended to create a new category of
expropriation, but that it effectively has the same meaning as an indirect
expropriation under international law.
128
The fact that the word "measure" is defined broadly in Article 201:1 of
the NAFTA lends further support to the above interpretation. According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, "tantamount" means "[t]hat which amounts
to as much, or comes to the same thing; something equivalent (to); an
equivalent". 129 Similarly, the French text of the NAFTA substitutes the
word "tantamount" with "equivalent": ". . . ni prendre une mesure equiva-
lent a la nationalisation ou a 1 'expropriation d' tel investissement. . ."
In the end, the phrase "measures tantamount to" should be read in a
manner similar to an indirect expropriation. It merely ensures that the Par-
ties cannot claim that Article 1110 of the NAFTA was intended to apply
narrowly. As well, it will prevent Parties from arguing that certain forms of
measures are excluded from Article 1110 of the NAFTA. Accordingly, for
the purposes of the remainder of the paper, the phrase "measures tanta-
mount to" an expropriation is treated as being synonymous with the phrase
"indirect expropriation."
IV. ARTICLE 1110 OF THE NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Generally speaking, a measure enacted or adopted by a government
will not amount to a compensable injury on the basis of an indirect expro-
priation unless the measure is unreasonably substantial or otherwise has
more than an ephemeral impact on the ability of the property owner to use
and enjoy his or her property. As noted, the dividing line is somewhat
fluid, with some types of measures being more likely to result in an expro-
priation than others. In all cases, however, the mere fact that a measure has
some injurious impact on the value, use or enjoyment of property is not suf-
ficient to establish the expropriation. At the same time, and as referred to in
a few instances above, in certain circumstances a measure may not give rise
to a compensable injury notwithstanding that the threshold level imposed
by an effects-based test is exceeded. Where a measure is enacted pursuant
to a government's police power, provided that the effect is not excessively
127 Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J. TRAISNAT'L L. 259, 317 (1994); see also,
Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for Economic Injury to
Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico after the NAFTA, 25 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1147,1179-1180 (1994).
128Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 para. 29
(Aug. 31, 2000)
129 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
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onerous, the government has a valid defense to having to pay compensation
to the injured alien. As discussed below, the police power exception is an
accepted principle of international law.
In the context of environmental and forest conservation measures, the
police power defense serves as a potentially important tool for governments
to enact or adopt necessary measures without having to compensate injured
aliens. There are, however, limitations on how far governments can go be-
fore which their measures will give rise to a compensable injury. This sec-
tion considers the hazy area of the police power exception. In turn, this
discussion will be material to the later analysis of the application of Article
1110 of the NAFTA to the MB Acquisition.
A. Police Power Measures
1. The Police Power Exception-The "Shadow Land" of Expropriation
Law
The police power represents the major exception to the requirement
that property owners be compensated for their expropriated property. This
exception, which is recognized under both international and municipal law,
serves as the fundamental means by which a government can implement
necessary programs in pursuit of safety, health, welfare, comfort and morals
without being consequently held liable to compensate property owners
whose property has been negatively impacted as a result of such measures.
Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court explained the principle,
as it applies under U.S. takings jurisprudence, as follows:
Suffice it to say that government regulation-by definition-involves the ad-
justment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some
potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require
compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the govern-
ment to regulate by purchase. 1
30
Similar to the initial difficulty of establishing the difference between a
mere interference with property rights and an expropriation, the demarca-
tion between a police measure and a compensable injury (i.e., by definition,
both are in pursuit of a valid public purpose) is, what Seymour Rubin terms,
the "shadow land" of takings law.'
3
A major reason behind the confusion surrounding the police power ex-
ception has been the failure of either international or municipal law to offer
a comprehensive and widely accepted grounding for identifying its nature
130Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
'
3
'Rubin states in SEYMOUR J. RuBn, PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT - LEGAL &
ECONoMIC REALrTIEs 34-5 (1956) that:
It is clear, thus, that private property may sometimes be taken without compensation. What is not
clear is the shadow land between the two black-letter principles of just compensation for the taking
of private property for public use and of legitimate exercise of the police power (emphasis added).
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or scope. Both Grotius and Pufendor, writing in the thirteenth century, rec-
ognized that property must be regulated and managed in a manner that ad-
vances public welfare.132 Similarly, the police power exception itself has
existed as an accepted principle since at least before the inception of the
United States Constitution. 13  Yet, the police power exception has re-
mained an amorphous and indeterminate principle.
For all of its shortcomings, however, the police power exception repre-
sents a necessary limitation on private property rights. Penal measures rep-
resent a fitting illustration of the importance of the police power exception.
How could a State enforce its penal laws if it was subsequently liable to
property owners for the incursive effect of those laws (e.g., through a sei-
zure of assets)?
Penal measures are local in character and vary between nations. Ac-
cording to Friedman, "[i]nternational law regards these measures [i.e., penal
ones], which are described as confiscation, as falling strictly within the ju-
risdiction of the State in whose territory the unlawful act is committed.'
34
Similarly, in explaining the importance of penal measures in securing a safe
society and advancing legitimate interests, Wortley notes that:
Moreover, legislation forbidding, on pain of forfeiture, the use of property for
noxious or immoral trades is common to many systems of law. Such bona fide
legislation imposing sanctions under criminal law is clearly in the public inter-
est and, when it operates within the State imposing it, it cannot generally be
regarded as improper by other States with similar legislation, since its object is
to safeguard the public interest, that is the well-being of the generality of per-
son and property under the State's control, even though this is sanctioned by
penalties or confiscations.
135
This line of reasoning also has been accepted by international courts
and tribunals. For example, in the Louis Chazen case,136 the Mexican Gov-
ernment confiscated a U.S. national's property after he was suspected of
smuggling property in violation of Mexico's customs regulations. The
claimant subsequently alleged that, inter alia, he was entitled to compensa-
tion on the basis of his loss of property. The Claims Commission, stating
that "Mexico, as a sovereign State can promulgate such rules as it may
deem convenient in order to protect the revenue in its Customs houses and
132 See WHITE, supra note 79, at 145. Sax notes that the public trust doctrine, which is
similar to the police power exception in that it is aimed at protecting such things as navigable
water and fisheries, also has its roots in Roman Law. See Joseph L. Sax, Public Trust Doc-
trine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 476
(1970); see also, Ralph W. Johnson and William C. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 22 (1994).
133See Hippler, supra note 86, at 298, where Harlan J. asserted that, unless formally ex-
cluded, police powers must be read into the Constitution.
134FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at I.
135 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 42.136 Louis Chazen (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, IV R.LA.A. 564 (1930).
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on its frontiers ,,37 found in Mexico's favour on the basis that it was a
valid penal measure that fell within its police powers. The Commission ex-
plained that a State may establish penal measures and confiscate property'
provided that it is necessary for advancing a valid police power objective.'
At the same time, confiscations must comply with the rule against exces-
siveness, be in pursuit of generally accepted principles of international law
and must not offend the international minimum standard of treatment.
1 39
The police power exception does not deny either the existence of a
taking or an injury. Rather, it is grounded in the belief that certain goals are
so important for advancing public welfare that the general rule requiring
compensation must be set aside in favour of one that recognizes that private
citizens, including foreign investors, must shoulder certain public responsi-
bilities. The exact nature and scope of the police power exception, how-
ever, is far from clear.140 The problem is generally not with defining the
137Id. at 567.
138As well, in Sedco, the Iran-U.S. claims Tribunal noted that: "[t]he one exception to
this rule, forfeiture for crime, is distinguishable because in such cases the person(s) affected
do not rightfilly possess the title to property in question." Sedco Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co., 84 I.L.R. 483, 513 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1985). Forfeitures and confiscations are com-
monly employed by States for such things as fighting against the trafficking of narcotics, tax
evasion and other offenses linking the acquisition with illicit activities. In the environmental
sphere, a government can use the threat of confiscation as a powerful tool for ensuring that
certain product/process standards, regulations or licence requirements are met.
1 9Wortley warns that the mere fact that a State points to a valid objective is not suffi-
cient for alleviating it of its international legal responsibility:
Acts of confiscation or expropriation purporting to be based upon public international law itself will,
however, be strictly construed against the expropriating Power, and failure to comply with the con-
ditions laid down by that law may result in those acts being treated as void by foreign States and by
tribunals applying international law.
WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 42.14 Some jurists have argued for a narrow approach whereby it only refers to measures
which fall under the strict, traditional purposes of government. In this regard, Epstein argues
that those measures that fall under the police power exception should be restricted to things
that are necessary to "maintain peace and order within the territory" since, according to him,
it ultimately defines the "central purpose" of government. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKiNrs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985). As well, in
Armstrong v. United States, referring to the so-called takings clause in the U.S. Constitution,
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that a certain degree of protection is needed in order "to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960). On the other hand, some commentators have argued for a broader right, rec-
ognizing that the needs and functions of government change as society becomes more ur-
banized and complex. For example, see Nicolau Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and
Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1988), for an argument against the morality of owning
land and natural resources, and Sam D. Starritt and John H. McClanahan, Land-Use Plan-
ning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the
Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994), LAND AND
WATER L. REV. 415 (1995), for an argument that placing strict controls on the ability ofgov-
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principle. Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mugler,
most jurists agree that the police power covers measures in pursuit of "pub-
lic health, the public morals, and the public safety ... , Instead, in the
same sense as the expropriation issue more generally, the difficulty lies in
determining the outer limits of the exception.
While the scope of the police power exception is not entirely clear, and
a "shadow land" remains, the following are recognized limitations on the
application of the police power exception: (a) for certain types of measures,
a compensable injury will be found where all rights or incidents of owner-
ship have been removed; (b) a valid police measure may ripen into a com-
pensable injury where it is excessive; and (c) a measure may not be applied
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. These three exceptions are ex-
plained in greater detail below.
B. Exceptions to the Police Power Defense
1. Outright or Complete Destruction of Property
The cases have generally held that a compensable injury may be estab-
lished where a claimant loses all benefits of ownership. For example, in the
case of a forest permit, which is the subject-matter of the Sierra Opinion
discussed below, where all of the rights existing under a permit are re-
moved, such as in pursuit of a forest conservation strategy, as opposed to,
for example, the failure to comply with the terms of the permit, then a com-
pensation requirement may still apply. As well, this may explain why in
Metalclad the NAFTA arbitral tribunal stated that Mexico's Ecological De-
gree would amount to a taking for the purposes of Article 1110 of the
NAFTA since the Claimant in that case effectively had its entire benefits of
ownership removed.14
In Sedco, for example, after recognizing the existence of the police
power as an accepted principle of international law, the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal provided that "[w]hen an action, as is the case with the application
of Clause C, results in an outright transfer of title rather than incidental
economic injury, however, a taking must be presumed to have occurred."'143
As well, in the De Garmendia case,144 despite the fact that the specific
measure likely constituted a police power measure,1 45 compensation was
emments to pass necessary land-use regulations may work against the protection of pristine
ecological habitats.
141Hippler, supra note 87, at 297.
142Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 para. 111
(Aug. 31, 2000)
143Sedco Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 84 I.L.R. 483, 513 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1985).
144De Garmendia Case, VENEZUELAN ARBITRAIONS OF 1903 10, 13 (1903).
145Although not mentioning the police power exception directly, creating a clear view of
the port could qualify as a police power measure. For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina
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awarded to the Claimant after the Venezuelan Government destroyed the
Claimant's wooden house in order to provide an unencumbered view of the
port.146 Finally, although finding that the particular facts of the case did not
support an expropriation, in French, the New York Court of Appeals held
that a taking may be found where all benefits are lost regardless of whether
there actually has been a physical appropriation of property:
If the majority means that the pesos or the certificates have not been physically
taken from Ritter's possession, no one will dispute with this. Since when,
however, must there be a physical taking for there to be a "confiscation"?
When a zoning law has been held unconstitutional as confiscatory, there is
never an actual taking... The zoning analogy here is perfect. The police
power may not be used to deprive a property owner of all enjoyment of his
property. Likewise, the need to preserve a country's international economic
position does not permit the destruction of all benefits of contractual rights
without limit.
1 47
The case law seems to support the conclusion that where a measure in
pursuit of a police power objective removes all benefits of ownership, either
by physical appropriation or indirectly by denying an owner of all economi-
Coastal Council, the United States Supreme Court had to determine whether a taking had
occurred after the California Coastal Commission demanded that, in return for a construction
permit, the Plaintiff provide the State with a public easement over its property. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Commission argued, inter alia,
that the easement was necessary because it would protect, "the public's ability to see the
beach, assisting the public in overcoming the "psychological barrier" to using the beach cre-
ated by a developed shoreline..." Id. Although Scalia J. did not say so definitively, it ap-
pears that he would have accepted the necessity of keeping sight-lines open as a valid police
power measure (the Plaintiff won on different grounds). Notwithstanding the above, how-
ever, it is not clear that the Venezuelan Government's actions were in pursuit of a police
power objective. For example, if the government's actions were geared specifically at the
claimant's property because the claimant was a foreigner (i.e., applying in a discriminatory
manner), then it would not have been a legitimate police power. Alternatively, a tribunal
may have found that the measure imposed too great a burden on one individual and was,
therefore, not excusable under the police power exception. See Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
146In the Upton case, Commissioner Bainbridge awarded compensation to the claimant
after the Venezuelan Government scripted his property into service in order to help the Gov-
ernment fight rebel forces. Upton Case, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONs OF 1903 172 (prepared
by Jackson H. Ralston, 1904). Interestingly, Commissioner Bainbridge not only awarded
damages for the property which was completely destroyed, but also awarded partial damage
for a single piece of property which, in the Commissioner's opinion, retained some value and
use. Considering that the taking here clearly fit within the State's police powers, it is unclear
why compensation was awarded for that latter property. For example, in Kugele, (referred to
favourably by both Sedco and the American Third Restatement of the Law) the Court held
that a mere economic loss incurred during the exercise of the police powers will not by itself
constitute a compensable injury. See Kugele v. Poland (Germany v. Poland), 6 Ann. Dig. 69
(Upper Silesian Arbit. Trib. 1932)
147French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 I.L.R. 6, 33 (N.Y. 1968).
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In some cases, a measure aimed at a valid police power objective may
result in a compensatory injury because of the excessive manner in which it
is applied. 49 Possible marks of excessiveness include situations where a
measure runs for an unreasonable period of time, where it applies too
broadly, or where it imposes onerous requirements or sanctions. Accord-
ingly, States have an obligation to ensure that their measures do not en-
croach upon alien property rights to an extent greater than is necessary to
achieve their policy goals. According to Wortley, problems of excessive-
ness often breed in situations where a State misinterprets or misconstrues
the nature and meaning of its sovereignty. In other words, where a State
feels that it can disregard validly obtained property rights:
In its extreme form, the notion of eminent domain, whereby a State may seize
any property for any public purposes on any terms, under its own law, confuses
sovereignty with ownership and tends to see the sovereign, not as an institution
for the protection of its subjects' rights within the rule of law, but as the real
owner of those rights, which, for such reasons as it thinks fit, it may concede or
withdraw at will by virtue of its sovereignty.150
International expropriation law attempts to guard against such abuses.
The Bischoff case represents an apt example of a valid police measure
which resulted in a compensable taking because of the unreasonable length
of time in which it applied.15 1 Despite the fact that Umpire Duffield found
that:
The case shows ... that the carriage was taken in the proper exercise of dis-
cretion by the police authorities. Certainly during an epidemic of an infectious
148 Even this rule is unclear since, for example, penal measures regularly result in a com-
plete loss of property, yet such a loss does not result in an expropriation.
149 Since Justice Holme's well-cited decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the
U.S. takings jurisprudence has recognized that a valid police power measure which goes "too
far" will entitle a property owner to compensation. 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
150 WORTLEY, supra note 16, at 12-13.51 In that case, a German national owned and operated a carriage business in Venezuela.
In August 1898, after the Government learned that the claimant had carried two passengers
with smallpox, the Government detained the carriage from the claimant's premises. At the
time, the Government was fighting a small-pox epidemic and wanted to ward-off any further
spread of the disease. However, the Government was subsequently informed that its infor-
mation was incorrect and that the claimant's carriage had in fact not carried any infected
passengers. The Government nevertheless kept the carriage for a long period of time. The
claimant argued that he was entitled to compensation for the injuries that he sustained as a
result of the carriage being detained. Bishoff Case, VENEZUELAN ARBITRATIONS OF 1903
581 (prepared by Jackson H. Ralston, 1904).
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disease there can be no liabilit for the reasonable exercise of police power,
even though a mistake is made. 5 2
Ie nevertheless held in the claimant's favour on the basis that:
But it is held in a number of cases before the arbitration commission involving
the taking and detention of property, where the original taking was lawful, that
the defendant government is liable for damages for the detention of the prop-
erty for an unreasonable length of time and injuries to the same during that pe-
riod.
1 5 3
The Bischoff case demonstrates that a police power measure, otherwise
not compensable, may nevertheless result in a compensatory injury where it
applies for an excessive period of time.' 54
3. Measures which Apply in an Arbitrary or Discriminatory Manner
A fundamental element of a just and democratic legislative and judicial
system is that it operates free from arbitrariness and discrimination. This
principle is also recognized under international law.155 The Court in West
'
521d. at 581.
15 3 Id. Similar reasoning was employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California (despite be-
ing a temporary measure, damages were awarded to the Plaintiff on account of the measure
imposing an excessive burden on the Plaintiff property owner). 482 U.S. 304 (1987); see
also, Glenn H. Boss II and Robert C. Apgar, Concurrency and Growth Management: Law-
yer's Primer, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 1,21 (1991).
'mOf course, this does not mean that a tribunal or panel will always intervene. For ex-
ample, in Int'l Bank, an arbitral tribunal was asked to consider whether the Dominican Re-
public's forest conservation measures, which imposed a number of cutting restrictions on
lumber mills, amounted to an expropriation. In the Matter of Arbitration between Int'l Bank
and Overseas Private Inv. Corp. 11 I.L.M. 1216 (1972). The tribunal, after deferring to the
stated purpose of the measures, as well as giving leeway to the Government because of its
inexperience with conservation measures, found against the Claimant. See id. According to
the tribunal, the measures were not compensable because they amounted to a valid exercise
of the Dominican Republic's right to implement police power measures. See id. However,
the tribunal noted that compensation may be required where a valid police power measure
imposes an excessive burden on an alien property owner:
We, of course, do not feel that any series of police regulations or bureaucratic delays establishing
"stop and go" pattern would necessarily be reasonable, or not amount to a "taling" of property, but
only that the particular regulations promulgated by the Dominican Government and administratively
applied in this case were, under all of the circumstances of the case, not arbitrary, unreasonable, in
violation of international law or a "taking" of property requiring payment of compensation under the
relevant international standard.
Id. at 1227.
155The requirement against discriminatory measures has been rebuked by some jurists as
both impossible to detect and unnecessary. These authors generally argue that many expro-
priations and nationalizations are inherently discriminatory because they are often specifi-
cally directed at foreigners in an attempt to facilitate the transfer of economic power and
control from aliens to nationals. As well, they explain that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to detect. Somarajah, who in the past has argued for strong protection and rights
for lesser-income countries, went so far as asserting that even racially-motivated discrimi-
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asserted that an otherwise valid measure may be deemed to be an expro-
priation where it is "so unreasonable or grossly offends against the alien's
right to fair and equitable treatment, or so clearly deviates from customary
standards of behaviour. ' 15 6 In this respect, Dunn noted that:
From a functional point of view, a possible solution would be to retain the rule
of intervention but except from its operation all governmental acts infringing
upon vested property rights which were the result of bonafide social or eco-
nomic reform, genuinely aimed to benefit the nation as a whole, and were not
discriminatory against foreigners as such, nor liable to disturb to an substantial
extent the existing methods of carrying on intercourse between nations. Such a
rule, while discouraging arbitrary or dishonest governmental acts causing dam-
age to foreigners, would at the same time provide the necessary flexibility in
the present system to meet new conditions special conditions in particular part
of the world arising from the peculiarities of different peoples. It would in ef-
natory measures should not be disallowed or ruled illegal. Instead, she argues that as long as
compensation is available, there is no reason to explore a State's motives:
The better view and the view which the law should accept is to treat the nationalization motivated by
reasons of racial discrimination as valid because, as a result of new developments in international
law an alternative remedy is provided. Such nationalizations become evidence of racial discrimina-
tion and give rise to a distinct cause of action which could be pursued by an injured alien's state.
This view would preserve the State's right to nationalize which is supported by modem develop-
ments while at the same time ensuring that aliens are protected and discriminatory conduct is de-
terred.
M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 187-188 (1986).
At least on the surface, Somarajah's argument that States must be free to pass whatever
measures they deem necessary appears fair. Upon closer review, however, it must be re-
jected. Somarajah's argument ignores the very meaning and existence of international law
and membership in an international community. No system of law, whether it be interna-
tional or municipal, can legitimately recognize destructive forms of discrimination (i.e., as
opposed to other forms, like "reverse-discrimination", which, because they favour one group
of people over another, by definition are discriminatory. These forms of discrimination must
be excluded because they serve a necessary role in ridding society of built-in biases and dis-
advantages between people). International law cannot, for example, sanction discriminatory
measure similar to those practiced by Nazi Germany during the Second World War where
the Nazis confiscated property owned by minorities and dissidents, even had compensation
been given. International tribunals and arbitral panels have an important role in guarding
against discriminatory measures. The requirement against arbitrariness and capriciousness is
similarly required in municipal law. See Laura M. Schleich, Takings: The Fifth Amendment
Government Regulation, and the Problem of the Relevant Parcel, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 381, 384 (1993).
156 West v. Multibanco Comermex SA, 84 I.L.R. 187, 199 (1987) (relying on MANN, su-
pra note 76, at 377). Similarly, Wortley asserted that:
Even genuine health and planning legislation.. .may be abusively operate, for example, if health or
quarantine regulations are imposed not bona fide to protect public health, but with the real, though
unavowed, purpose of ruining a foreigner trader. When the evidence of such indirect motive is clear,
the foreign State concerned may properly protest on the ground that the trader is being unjustifiable
deprived of his rights.
Wortly, supra note 16, at 110.
Shedding Light on Article 1110
21:243 (2000)
fect help to perpetuate the present system by making it more adaptable to a
changing world. 57
Ultimately, Dunn asserted that a democratic system demands "just and
fairness" by a State's legislative and judicial processes. Any governmental
initiative, whether it be in pursuit of an environmental or other valid police
power objective, must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. 58
C. Assessment of the Application and Scope of the Police Power Exception
The full scope of the police powers exception under international law
has not yet been fully developed. More case law and attention must be de-
voted to the exception. The influential American (Third) Restatement of the
Law suggests that the scope of the police power exception under interna-
tional law can be discerned through the U.S. takings jurisprudence. After
noting in paragraph 712(g) of the Restatement that "[a] state is not respon-
sible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from
bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action
of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states,
if it is not discriminatory," the accompanying comment to that paragraph
provides that "[i]n general, the line in international law is similar to that
drawn in United States jurisprudence for purposes of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution in determining whether there has
been a taking requiring compensation."' 59 According to the Restatement,
deference should be paid to the U.S jurisprudence on this matter.
While the suggestion in the Third Restatement that the U.S. takings ju-
risprudence should guide the determination of the scope of the police pow-
ers exception under international law is a good one, it is not sufficient. To
begin, the scope of the police power exception under U.S. law also is not
settled. Since the mid-1970s, there have been a plethora of takings cases at
the state and federal levels which have given a wide range of scope-from
very narrow to very wide-to the police power exception.160 As well, the
157Fredrick Sherwood Dunn, International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUM.
L. Rav. 166, 180 (1928).
'
58The requirements prohibiting arbitrary and discriminatory measures are unquestiona-
bly incorporated into the NAFTA. Paragraph (b) of Article 1110 provides that a NAFTA
Party may not implement a measure which applies in a discriminatory manner. As well,
paragraph (c) of that same Article requires that investments of NAFTA investors be ac-
corded both due process of law and the international minimum standard of treatment. See
NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1110(b) and (c).
159RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, at 201, 211. This paragraph of the Restatement was fa-
vourably referred to in Pope & Talbot, supra note 6, at para. 99.
16°For example, in Penn-Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, the City of New York
designated Grand Central Terminal a "landmark site pursuant to New York State's "Land-
marks Preservation Law". 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). As a result of the designation, the
Plaintiff was not permitted to construct a fifty-story building above its structure. The Plain-
tiff argued that its valuable air rights had been expropriated. The United States Supreme
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U.S. courts have suggested numerous tests depending on whether there has
been a "physical invasion, ' 161 no "average reciprocity of advantage, ' 62 a
Court did not agree, and held that it "does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn
Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." See id. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that the law still allows the Plaintiff to obtain a "reasonable return" on
its investment. Hence, the police power exception was interpreted broadly. This can be
contrasted with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, where
the South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act was held to constitute a compensable
taking because it limited the Plaintiff's ability to construct a home on his property. Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also Dolan v. City of Tigfard
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
161 A physical invasion refers to a situation where a government formally or informally
takes property. Compare Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 US 166 (1871) (plaintiff's property
was flooded as a result of the government constructing a nearby dam), with United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)(liability assessed against the government on the basis that it
had authorized constant flights over the Plaintiffs property). The Supreme Court has held
that a permanent physical invasion of land constitutes a compensable injury regardless of the
public purpose which it serves. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, (1982). There are a variety of rea-
sons why a physical invasion has been treated as a bright-line test for establishing a taking.
To begin, it is easy to identify. As well, there is a general fear against allowing governments
to target certain individuals for expropriation. Some jurists, however, have criticized any
attempt to use the physical invasion test as a sole determinant as to whether a taking has oc-
curred. See Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 955, 959 (1992). Berger also
argues that differentiating between losses caused by a physical invasion or a regulatory
measure is not appropriate in terms of either justice or economics. See Lawrence Berger, A
Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 171 (1974).162This refers to a situation where a property owner is required to do something to his or
her property (generally in connection with other similarly situated property owners) and,
while the property owner receives some benefit, it is intended to benefit society generally.
Under this category, a property owner is not entitled to compensation because, despite the
fact that the public receives a benefit, the property owner is better off as a result of the meas-
ure:
economic development should be encouraged to benefit the overall quality of life ... The idea that
this development made the owner's overall property interests monetarily more valuable was seen as
at least a sufficient offset for the owner's forced contribution of property or a monetary share of the
costs. Although the owner had lost his or her freedom of choice as to how best use his or her prop-
erty, society had made an efficient choice for the owner, and thus due process of law did not man-
date that the regulation be accompanied by compensation.
Hippler, supra note 86, at 678.
The Supreme Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous CoalAssn v. DeBenedictis, repre-
sents the high-water mark for the average reciprocity of advantage test. 480 U.S. 470
(1987). In that case, after reciting facts which were almost identical to those recited in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court broadened the test to include those benefits which
one naturally receives as a result of being a member of society: "[w1hile each of us is bur-
dened somewhat by such restrictions, we in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are
placed on others." 260 U.S. 393,491 (1922); see also Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S.
22 (1922); Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 at 393; Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 147 (Jus-
tice Rehnquist dissenting); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992).
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removal of all or certain strands in the "bundle of rights,'
163 a "nuisance 164
or a "noxious use."' 65 Until settled, the U.S. takings jurisprudence cannot
163 Property is sometimes described as consisting of numerous strands of rights totalling a
"bundle". Naturally, some of these rights, particularly the right to exclude, have been con-
sidered more worthy of protection than others. According to Hippler, the American courts
have recently given full vigor and placed considerable emphasis on the "bundle of rights
regulatory takings analysis." Hippler, supra note 86, at 656. Generally, removal of one or a
few strands from the bundle has been insufficient for establishing a taking. Thus, in Andrus,
(commenting on two legislative acts which were aimed at protecting eagles and migratory
birds and resulting in the Defendant being denied the right to, inter alia, sell, barter, export
or import eagle feathers which were part of a Native American artefact) the Supreme Court
provided that:
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of artefacts, and there is no physical in-
vasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been posed on one means of dis-
posing of the artefacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a
taking., because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 57 (1979).
However, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court, explaining that "one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property"
[is the] right to exclude others", found for the Plaintiff even though only one strand, the right
to exclude, had been removed. 444 U.S. 164 (1979); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
1"'The principle that compensation will not be owed where a measure is aimed at pre-
venting a nuisance derives from the common law and is embodied in the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas which has been recognized in both municipal law and, to a lesser de-
gree, international law. See Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
388 (1926) [hereinafter Village of Euclid]; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). A nuisance essentially refers to an "annoyance" or some risk
caused by one property owner towards a third party or parties. Thus, in Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park, a Defendant was not required to compensate the Plaintiff after it restricted the
Plaintiff's right to transport wastes through public streets because of the foul smell, insects
and health risks associated with the subject wastes. 97 U.S. 659 (1878). The general reason
against compensating property owners for losses which they sustain as a result of complying
with measures that prevent nuisances (the same applies for "noxious uses"), is that no one
has a right to annoy or harm others. As well, it is often not an activity itself which consti-
tutes a nuisance, but rather is the effect that the activity under the particular circumstances,
has on others. Justice Sutherland explained a nuisance as " a right thing in the wrong place,
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
165There is generally little difference between a noxious use and a nuisance. A "noxious
use" basically refers to a situation where a government is attempting to prevent the commis-
sion of a harm against a third party or parties. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Chief of Police
of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of a brickyard in a residential area); Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (restriction against excavating sand and
gravel below the water line); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of diseased
cedar trees in order to prevent infection of nearby apple orchards); J. Parsons case (Great
Britain v. U.S.) American and British Cl. Arb. 587 (1925) (Report of F.K. Nielsen) (destruc-
tion of poisonous alcohol). Once again, the theory against compensating property owners
who suffer a loss as a result of complying with an order aimed at a noxious use is that no one
has a right to harm others. A restriction under this heading merely requires a property owner
to do what she or he is otherwise required to do under the law (i.e., ceasing a harmful activ-
ity or inactivity). While this line of reasoning seemingly makes sense, it has not been en-
tirely welcomed. According to Sax, the basis for the noxious use or harm test is that "while
in general established economic interests cannot be diminished merely because of a resulting
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represent an opiniojuris. While certain cases may be consulted by interna-
tional tribunals, as a whole, it cannot be considered determinative.
While the scope of the police power exception is not entirely certain, it
remains an important exception to the rule that aliens must be compensated
where their property is expropriated or nationalized. For NAFTA Parties,
their only excuse for not paying compensation to a NAFTA investor whose
investment has been expropriated is if the expropriatory measure constitutes
a police power measure. Accordingly, the principle is of vital importance to
NAFTA Parties when they implement their environmental measures, such
as forest conservation and other environmental programs. Of course, the
measure must amount to an expropriation in the first place, otherwise it
does not even give rise to a compensation requirement. A mere hindrance
that has less than an ephemeral impact on the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty is not sufficient to establish an expropriation claim.
public benefit, that rule does not apply where the individual whose interest is to be dimin-
ished himself created the need for public regulation by his conduct." Sax, supra note 133, at
48.
Sax argues that the test necessarily attaches some notion of "moral blameworthiness" in
the sense that it places fault on an individual for doing something against the public interest.
He complains that it is often not clear that a particular individual deserves that dubious dis-
tinction. In other words, a noxious use may derive out of innocuous situations, such as
where a company locates to a particular region or site because it was either encouraged to do
so or because, at the time of locating, the site or region was barren. In the end, Sax rejected
the noxious use test on the basis that while it may be "easy" to administer, it ultimately suf-
fers from the fact that "[i]f we are talking about blameworthiness, some moral wrongdoing
or conscious act of dangerous risk-taking which induces us to shift the cost to a particular
individual, it simply does not exist in these cases." Id. at 50. As well, although for a slightly
different reason, Michelman also rejected the noxious use test. According to him, the prob-
lem can be illustrated in the following scenario:
For illustration of this approach, let us compare a regulation forbidding continued operation of a
brick works which has been annoying residential neighbours with one forbidding an owner or rare
meadowland to develop it so as to deprive the public of the benefits of drainage and wildlife conser-
vation. According to the theories was are now to consider, a person affected by the second regula-
tion would have the stronger claim to compensation. But even as to him, the matter is not free of
ambiguity. To see this clearly, we can take as a third example a regulation forbidding the erection of
billboards along the highway. Shall we construe this regulation as one which prevents the "harms"
of roadside blight and distraction, or as one securing the "benefits" of safety and amenity? Shall we
say that it prevents the highway abutter from inflicting injury on passing motorists, or that it en-
hances the value of the public's highway facility? This third example serves to expose one basic dif-
ficulty with the method of classifying regulations as compensable or not according to whether they
prevent harms or extract benefits. Such a method will not work unless we can establish a benchmark
of "neutral" conduct which enables us to say where refusal to confer benefits (not reversible without
compensation) slips over into readiness to inflict harms (reversible without compensation).
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'Just Compensation'Law, 80 HAnv. L.R. 1165, 1197 (1967).
For Michelman, the key difficulty is in articulating the difference between a "benefit" and
a "harm". However, see the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in Lucas, where he
criticizes this type of thinking because it ultimately calls into question the value of the com-
mon law generally. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1052. Finally, Clarke also condemns this approach
since "[e]veryone harms everyone else in one way or another and anything can be harmful."
Charles H. Clarke, The Owl and the Takings Clause, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 693, 695 (1994).
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V. MISCONCEPTION AND CONFUSION OVER THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER
11 OF THE NAFTA
A. Comments on and Opposition to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA
Article 1110 of the NAFTA covers both direct and indirect expropria-
tions, as well as measures tantamount to an expropriation. The specific ob-
ligations in Article 1110 are governed by, and are to be interpreted in
accordance with, the following three sources of law: interpretation notes by
the Commission; the terms of the NAFTA; and international law.
To date, no interpretation note has been issued by the Commission. As
such, the only two sources upon which a NAFTA Tribunal could use when
interpreting Article 1110 is the terms of the NAFTA itself, as well as gen-
eral principles of international law.
As noted in Section II above, Article 1131 of the NAFTA provides that
a Tribunal shall be guided by the NAFTA as a whole. Both the Preamble to
the NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement provide a number of
key objectives that may guide a Tribunal when it considers a claim that
arises from an environmental measure. The Preamble to the NAFTA pro-
vides, for example, that the Parties are to promote sustainable development,
develop and enforce their environmental laws and regulations, and adopt
measures that are consistent with environmental protection and conserva-
tion. Article 1114 of the NAFTA provides that nothing in Chapter 11 shall
be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure that is appropriate to ensure that the investment activity in its ter-
ritory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. The
Environmental Side Agreement explicitly provides that each Party has the
right to establish its own level of domestic environmental protection and
environmental policies and programs. While none of these provisions
trump the possible application of Article 1110 to a measure by a Party, they
may assist a tribunal in the determination of the scope of its key terms, ei-
ther on the basis of what is considered to be reasonable or in respect of the
scope of the police powers exception.
In addition to being informed by the terms of the NAFTA itself, inter-
national law has developed a set of rules and principles to determine the
existence of an expropriation. While some commentators on the NAFTA
claim that any interference with property rights will result in a compensable
injury, this is not consistent with general principles of international law. In
order for an interference with the use and enjoyment of an investment to
amount to an expropriation, the measure must be unreasonable and/or the
negative effect on the investment must be more than ephemeral. While this
is not explicitly stated in Chapter 11, it is required under international law;
the law applicable to the interpretation of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
This is not to suggest, however, that expropriation law is completely
settled and that no "shadow land" exists. There clearly is confusion over
the dividing line between a reasonable and an unreasonable measure; a
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temporary and a permanent interference; and an ephemeral versus a signifi-
cant effect. However, flux in the application of the law is not unique to Ar-
ticle 1110, or to Chapter 11 generally. By its nature, law is constantly
evolving. To suggest that because the law of expropriation is still evolving
the NAFTA Parties should abandon Chapter 11 altogether is, to quote an oft
repeated phrase, "to throw the baby out with the bath water." The underly-
ing basis for Chapter 11, namely to encourage trilateral direct investments
between the Parties, has not changed.1 66 Furthermore, the arguments raised
against Article 1110 ignore the existence of the police powers exception
which gives the Parties wide latitude to implement measures in support of
the environment or forest conservation.
Notwithstanding the wide and extensive attention given to Chapter 11,
in reality, there have been relatively few claims initiated thereunder. Be-
tween 1994 and 1999, there have only been approximately fourteen notices
of intent to initiate a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11:16 six against Can-
ada;168 three against the United States;169 and four against Mexico. 170 Con-
sidering that there has been hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign direct
investment by NAFTA investors in the territory of the three NAFTA Par-
ties, the total number of claims is minuscule.
171
166This purpose was explicitly recognized by the NAFTA arbitral tribunal in Metalclad.
167Because the process is conducted behind closed doors, it is unclear just how many
claims have been formally initiated against a Party. As such, it is entirely possible that there
have been a few additional (or less) claims initiated pursuant to Chapter 11 than the fourteen
stated herein. As well, it should be further borne in mind that some of the claims have not
gone beyond the notice of intent stage.
168Between 1994 and 1999, the following companies have been reported as having sub-
mitted a notice of intent to initiate a claim against the Government of Canada: Signa S.A. de
C.V., Ethyl Corporation (the Government of Canada settled, see supra note 3), S.D. Myers
Inc., Pope & Talbot (the arbitral tribunal released its decision with respect to Articles 1106
and 1110 only), Sun Belt Water, Inc., United Parcel Service, and Waste Management Incor-
porated. For a copy of pleadings, see Trade Negotiations and Agreements, Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-
e.asp#UPS (last updated Dec. 19, 2000).
'
69Between 1994 and 1999, the following companies have been reported as having sub-
mitted a notice of intent to submit a claim against the U.S. Government: The Loewen Group,
Inc., Methanex Corp, and Mondev (supporting documents on file with the author).
170Between 1994 and 1999, the following companies initiated a claim against the Gov-
ernment of Mexico: DESONA, MetalClad Corp. (the Claimant was successful under both
Articles 1105 and 1110 of the NAFTA), Waste Management Inc., and Karpa (on behalf of
Corporacion de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. de C.U. - CESMA) (supporting documents
on file with the author).
171 According to a recent report card on the NAFTA, investment to Canada from the
United States reached Cdn$147.3 billion in 1998, up 63% from 1993, while investment to
Canada from Mexico reached Cdn$464 million in 1998, tripling from 1993. In 1998, 68% of
foreign direct investment in Canada originated from a NAFTA country. THE DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (CANADA), THE NAFTA AT FIVE YEARS: A
PARTNERSHIP AT WORK 15-17 (1999).
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Yet, notwithstanding that relatively few claims have been initiated un-
der Chapter 11 and, in any event, that Chapter 11 is grounded in established
principles of international law, there have been numerous doomsday pre-
dictions about the impact that Chapter 11 has, or will have, on the ability of
the NAFTA Parties to implement necessary environmental and other social-
based legislation. Such dire predictions have not only emanated from tra-
ditional opponents to free trade, but also from more mainstream commen-
tators. For example, the following comments have been made regarding
Chapter 11:
The controversial Chapter 11 clause of NAFTA, which the Canadian
government is seeking to amend, allows companies to seek compensation from
the governments of Canada, Mexico or the U.S. for imposing measures that
impede commerce.
172
A largely defensive measure has become a strategic offensive weapon to
promote the interests of some corporations. (David Runnalls, President of the
International Centre of Sustainable Development)17
I would say NAFTA negotiators did not expect this provision would be
used as much as it has been by private companies. (Bill Merkin, Washington
Trade Consultant and former U.S. negotiator) 174
As well, under Chapter 11, the "investor-state" clause of NAFTA, U.S.
corporations have the right to sue for cash compensation if Canadian govern-
ments, federal or provincial, implement laws that affect their bottom-line prof-
its. Several recent Chapter 11 challenges have prevented Canada from setting
its own environmental and health standards and have placed its natural re-
sources at risk. (Maude Barlow, National Chair of the Counsel of Canadi-
ans) 17 5
That's [Chapter 11], the provision that allows private corporations to sue
countries for lost profits.
It would appear from some of the cases that have appeared that any time a
company is damaged in some way or form, or even where they may not be
damaged, they feel that they have a recourse to Chapter 11 and NAFTA, and
that's clearly not the intent of the parties. (Second comment made by former
Canadian International Trade Minister, Sergio Marchi) 176
Under the umbrella of international trade pacts, a spate of recent lawsuits
by outsiders has toppled environmental laws and so-called selective purchasing
laws in Massachusetts. In Mississippi, a Canadian funeral home operator is
using NAFTA to challenge an unfavourable court verdict.
172 Southland Focus: Methanex Files Suit Over Gas Additive Ban, L.A. TIMES, June 25,
1999, at C-2.
173 David Runnalls, quoted in NAFTA Lawsuits on the Rise - Think Tank Warns Environ-
ment Will Suffer, TORONTO STAR, June 23, 1999, at 1.
174 Bill Merkin, quoted in Damage Claims Upset NAFTA: Methanex Action may Boost
Plan to Limit Damage Suits, NATIONAL POST, June 17, 1999, at C-12.
17SMaude Barlow, Commentary, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, May 28, 1999, at A15.
176NAFTA Members Taking Stock on 5 h Anniversary - Marchi Hopes for Some Action
on Trade Irritants, TORONTO STAR Apr. 20, 1999, at 1.
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U.S. and Canadian critics are worried about an obscure provision of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, that gives foreign investors a
powerful weapon to attack laws they deem discriminatory, particularly in the
environmental and health safety arenas.1
77
As concerned as we were, we underestimated the potential power grab
and damage potential to the fundamentals of governance. (Lori Wallach, Di-
rector, Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch) 78
No one quite understood or anticipated where it [Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA] would go. (Barry Appleton, Canadian trade lawyer) 179
An issue that should not be neglected in considering potential threats to
the Canadian health system is the impact of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. This
chapter deals with the rights of cross border investors in the three countries. It
contains provisions repeating the duty of states to compensate investors whose
interests are expropriated. The object is to protect property owners in the event
of a public taking of their property. However, in a number of instances (See
Soloway, Note in the 1999 Canadian Yearbook of International Law) Compa-
nies subject to regulatory action by the NAFTA governments have argued that
their property has been expropriated, or have otherwise suffered damage
through a violation of Chapter 11. In one instance, where the Canadian gov-
ernment closed its borders to the importation of the gasoline additive MMT,
without at the same time banning the production of the chemical in Canada, the
company alleged and successfully won damages from the Federal Government
on the grounds that their investment in Canada had been expropriated. This is
arguably a very forced interpretation of the concept of expropriation but it was
successful.
The concern that regulatory action in respect of public heplth will be charac-
terized as expropriation is thus a serious issue. (Gottlieb & Pearson, for the
Canadian Health Coalition)'8 0
177 Trade Pacts Accused of Subverting U.S. Policies Commerce: Critics say Agreements
such as NAFT4 Give Foreign Interests Legal Ammunition to Influence Economy as well as
Safety, Health and Other Issues, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at Al.
178id.
179Id. The newspaper article noted that Barry Appleton was of the view that the NAFTA
has created an unexpectedly broad avenue for legitimate domestic regulations to be chal-
lenged under international law. Mr. Appleton's comments are interesting in light of the fact
that of the six notices of intent to initiate a claim submitted to the Government of Canada
under Chapter 11, Mr. Appleton has been involved on the claimants'-side for at least four of
them. As such, possibly more than any person, Mr. Appleton has had a major influence in
the types and breadth of claims initiated under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
180 Canadian Health Coalition, Who's Protecting Health and Medicare at Trade Talks,
(Oct. 29, 1999), at http://www. healthcoalition.ca/release/10299.htm. Gottlieb and Pearson
argued that health care should be exempt from international trade under the rubric of the pre-
cautionary principle. This would include trade matters pertaining to the sale of biotechnol-
ogy products and the provision of health care services. Examples of how Chapter 11 could
apply to the provision of health care services include, for example, if a party attempted to
close a biotechnology lab, in whole or in part, because it considered that the lab's new de-
velopmental products were potentially unsafe; or, separately under Article 1102 if a party
attempted to create rules and requirements designed to assist domestically owned controlled
labs only.
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An important, but little-known component of NAFTA is the new power it
grants to private corporations to directly attack laws and policies they deem
harmful to profitability. Under NAFTA's new investment protections (Chapter
11), the decisions made by local and national governments in all three NAFTA
countries are now subject to challenge before NAFTA tribunals by corporate
plaintiffs... And NAFTA has been wielded as a weapon to attack federal and
sub-federal environmental and public health safeguards, with a series of legal
challenges to countries environmental laws launched by corporations using
NAFTA's investment provisions (Chapter 11).8I'
The above statements concerning the scope and application of Chapter
11 of the NAFTA are by no means exhaustive. However, a recurring them
in most of the criticisms of Chapter 11 is that the Chapter will expose the
parties to costly claims arising from legislation or other measures which ad-
versely impacts the value, profitability or use of their investments.
The majority of the criticisms regarding Chapter 11 ignore issues of
degree and, either explicitly or implicitly, suggest that any negative impact
on property rights will give rise to a compensable injury. In attempting to
substantiate their criticisms of Chapter 11, these commentators variously
point to the supposed successful claim by Ethyl (see the Ethyl decision at
note 3) the "plethora" of cases initiated under Chapter 11 and the fact that
NAFTA Chapter 11 requires the application of vague principles of interna-
tional law. In reality, however the Canadian government's decision to
compensate Ethyl was not necessarily based on the merits of Ethyl's claim
but on the fact that an earlier AiT Panel already found that the Government
did not have the necessary scientific evidence to support its legislation. In
both DESONA and Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA arbitral tribunals refused to
compensate the Claimants merely because the value of their investments
had been negatively impacted by a valid governmental measure. Indeed, in
Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal rejected the notion that re-
duced profitability is sufficient to make out a claim under Article 1110, in-
stead finding that there must be evidence that the interference is
substantial. 1lS In Metalclad, while the NAFTA arbitral tribunal found in fa-
vour of the Claimant, it is instructive to note that the Claimant lost all bene-
fits of ownership. Notwithstanding the Tribunal's comments regarding the
Ecological Decree, at the end of the day the NAFTA Tribunal's decision
was unrelated to any environmental or health risk since the NAFTA Tribu-
nal was satisfied that the Claimant was complying with all environmental,
health and safety requirements of Mexico. While some hazy areas remain
181 Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, School of Real-Life Results: A Report Card, (De-
cember 1998), at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/NAFTA/reportsfive years.htm.
182 Specifically, the arbitral tribunal stated that: "Even accepting (for the purpose of this
analysis) the allegations of the Investor concerning diminished profits, the Tribunal con-
cludes that the degree of interference with the Investment's operations due to the Export
Control Regime does not rise to an expropriation (creeping or otherwise) within the meaning
of Article 1110." Pope & Talbott, supra note 5, at para. 102.
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over the demarcation point between an expropriation and the police power
exception, to suggest that the law is completely unsettled or that there is a
complete paucity of general principles of law is inaccurate and exaggerated.
A more tempered approach to Chapter 11 of the NAFTA is needed.
The Canadian government has already suggested that either an amendment
to or the adoption of an interpretative note is necessary in order to limit the
scope of the Chapter and, thus, protect future environmental and health
measures. In response to such suggestions, it was reported that Mexican
Trade Minister, Hermino Blanco, noted that "[w]e still have to see the way
in which panelists will decide in the different cases we have in front of
us.1 183 Minister Blanco's approach is the appropriate one. The govern-
ments of Canada, Mexico and the United States cannot allow their trade and
investment agenda to be driven by a few vocal opponents to the NAFTA.
Many of these opponents have an agenda that extends beyond Chapter 11.
For many of these opponents, Chapter 11 represents an anchor upon which
they can express their broader opposition to free trade and investment.
While the Canadian government is now leading the charge towards the
adoption of an amendment to or reform of Chapter 11, it was not long ago
that the former Canadian Minister of International Trade, Sergio Marchi,
wrote the following in an open letter to Ms. Maude Barlow, Chairperson of
The Counsel of Canadians and an ardent opponent of free trade, with re-
spect to Canada's support of the (then) proposed MAI:
It appears, regrettably, that you and your organization do not want your
fear-mongering to be impeded by knowledge of the facts.
My priority as Minister is trade promotion and promoting Canada's best
interests. Your priority appears to be book promotion and otherwise advancing
your own interests. This is your prerogative, but I find it unfortunate that you
persist in needlessly alarming and misleading Canadians while continuing to
ignore the facts of the situation.
The Government of Canada will be well served to keep the above in
mind when it considers either amending or reforming Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA.1
84
The so-called "fear-mongering" by the opponents to Chapter 11, as ex-
pressed by Minister Marchi in his letter to Ms. Barlow, has not been re-
stricted to issues pertaining to broad policy matters. Recently, the Sierra
Club attempted to use Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to thwart Weyerhaeuser's
Cdn $3.59 billion acquisition of MB. The Sierra Club, along with certain
183 Mexico, Canada at Odds on NAFTA Rules Changes - Marchi Pushing for Clarifica-
tion on Investments, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, June 19, 1999, at B2.
'84Letter from Sergio Marchi, International Trade Minister, Canada, to Maude Barlow,
National Volunteer Chairperson to The Council of Canadians (Mar. 19, 1998), at
http://www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca. Minister Marchi's comments were made in response to Ms.
Barlow's attempts to bring into question the efficacy of the MAI. Ms. Barlow was one of
the key architects in the public interest campaign which ultimately led to the demise of the
MAI.
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other environmental groups, appeared at numerous public hearings to ex-
press their concern over the MB Acquisition, arguing that the British Co-
lumbia government would be susceptible to costly litigation by
Weyerhaeuser under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Ms. Lisa Matthaus, a policy
analyst with the Sierra Club, was reported as stating that "Chapter 11 of
NAFTA allows investors from one member country to demand compensa-
tion if the government of another member introduces a law that interferes
with an investment.' 185  The Sierra Club commissioned a legal opinion
from a Canadian lawyer, Ms. Jessica Clogg, on the application of Chapter
11 to the MB Acquisition. In the end, the Sierra Opinion concluded that:
In my opinion, Minister of Forests' consent to the Weyerhaeuser acquisi-
tion of MB will create a NAFTA liability that will impede the realisation of
these objectives:
NAFTA would allow Weyerhaeuser to seek compensation in situations
where none would be payable to a Canadian company, or in greater amounts.
In particular, NAFTA would create obstacles for reducing the cut on lands
controlled by Weyerhaeuser. NAFTA also puts major limitations on the pro-
vincial government's capacity
, 
to effectively legislate in areas otherwise en-
tirely within its jurisdiction.
B. Sierra Club of British Columbia's Opposition to the Acquisition of
MacMillan Bloedel Limited by Weyerhaeuser Company
1. Description of the MacMillan Bloedel Acquisition
On June 21, 1999, Weyerhaeuser and MB jointly announced the then
proposed MB Acquisition. Under the terms of this agreement, MB share-
holders would receive, in exchange for each MB share, either 0.28 shares of
common stock in Weyerhaeuser or 0.28 equivalent exchangeable shares in a
new Weyerhaeuser Canadian subsidiary. According to a press release by
Weyerhaeuser, the MB Acquisition would result in significant benefits to
the combined shareholders, such as "through savings in transportation and
distribution, improving purchasing practices, increasing the balance in its
manufacturing system and streamlining operations.' 18 7
Prior to the MB Acquisition, MB was the largest forest company in
Canada, with operations in timberlands, containerboard packaging and solid
wood products. As part of the transaction, Weyerhaeuser acquired, among
185MacBlo Takeover Approval May Put B.C. in Legal Bind: Timber Cutting Licences
May Become Issue, Hearing Told, NATIONAL Post, Sept. 8, 1999, at C6.
186Jessica L. Clogg, Letter Regarding Proposed Acquisition of MacMillan Bloedel by
Weyerhaeuser - NAFTA Chapter 11 Implications (Sept. 2, 1999), at http://felix.vcn.bc.ca/w
cel/forestry/0902weyemaftasub.html [hereinafter Sierra Opinion].
187 Weyerhauser Official Web Site, Press Release, Weyerhaeuser Completes Acquisition
Of Macmillan Bloedel; Haskayne To Join Weyerhaeuser Board Of Directors (Nov. 1, 1999),
at http:llwww.wy.com/news/mb/default.asp.
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other assets, approximately 6.5 million acres of productive timberlands in
Canada, three containerboard mills and 19 converting facilities, six lum-
bermills and sawmills in Canada, two Canadian plywood facilities and three
oriented strand board (OSB) facilities.188 Weyerhaeuser also sought the re-
allocation of MB's four replaceable forest license agreements (two in part-
nership), two tree farm licenses and 263 timber licenses, which, in total,
allowed MB to cut 5.6 million cubic metres of wood annually on Crown
(British Columbia) lands. 89
Prior to the MB Acquisition, Weyerhaeuser, through its Weyerhaeuser
Canada, Ltd. ("Weyerhaeuser Canada") subsidiary, was already a signifi-
cant participant in the Canadian forest products industry. Weyerhaeuser
Canada employed 5,800 people, with operations in British Columbia, Al-
berta, Saskatchewan and Ontario. As well, it held renewal, long-term li-
censes on more than 27 million acres of forest land.190 Following the MB
Acquisition, the Weyerhaeuser family of companies became not only the
largest forest company in Canada, but one of the largest forest companies
globally. Following both shareholder approval and the approval of and/or
review by numerous regulatory authorities in Canada and in the United
States, the MB Acquisition was completed on November 1, 1999.
Among the various regulatory authorities that had to approve or other-
wise review the MB Acquisition was the B.C. Department of Forests. As
part of its review process, the Department of Forests held numerous open
town-hall meetings. The Sierra Club and other environmentalists appeared
before the Department of Forests, urging the Minister of Forests to reject
the MB Acquisition. In support of its position, the Sierra Club tabled the
Sierra Opinion which, as discussed below, predicted that if the MB Acqui-
sition were allowed to proceed, it would have dire consequences on the
continued ability of the B.C. Government to regulate in favour of the envi-
ronment, adopt forest conservation measures and settle First Nations' land
claims. The general conclusions arrived at by Ms. Clogg in the Sierra
Opinion are discussed in the subsection that follows.
2. Sierra Opinion
The Sierra Opinion concludes that Article 1110 of the NAFTA "would
create obstacles for reducing the cut on lands controlled by Weyerhaeuser."
191 NAFTA also puts major limitations on the provincial government's ca-
pacity to effectively legislate in areas otherwise entirely within its jurisdic-
tion. As a result, the Opinion recommends that the B.C. Government refuse
188 See Press Release, Weyerhaeuser Company completes acquisition of MacMillan
Bloedel (Nov. 1, 1999), at http://www.wy.comnews/mb/qassets.htm.
'
89 See Sierra Opinion, supra note 186.
19OSee Weyerhauser Operations in Canada: Overview (Apr. 1, 1999), at http://www.wy.c
om/canada.
191 Sierra Opinion, supra note 186, at 12.
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to grant the transfers necessary for Weyerhaeuser to complete the MB Ac-
quisition.
The Sierra Opinion correctly noted that, following the MB Acquisition,
Weyerhaeuser may be entitled to compensation in the event that its invest-
ments in Canada were expropriated. This is not, however, a particularly in-
sightful or, even, significant statement. Provided that Weyerhaeuser could
establish the prerequisites to establishing a claim, such as that the alleged
expropriation occurred as a result of a "measure," that Weyerhaeuser is an
"investor" and that it controls an "investment in Canada," all of which the
Sierra Opinion assumes to be the case, and, for the purposes of this paper, is
accepted to be true, provided that no lawful excuse exists (e.g., police pow-
ers measure or that a valid reservation exists), there is no debate that Article
1110 of the NAFTA would entitle Weyerhaeuser to compensation. Article
1110 states as much. The real significance is over the degree of effect that
is necessary to establish a claim. It is here that the Sierra Opinion exagger-
ates and misstates the application of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
The Sierra Opinion assumes that virtually any measure in support of
forest conservation or the environment that touches upon a NAFTA inves-
tor's investment will amount to a compensable injury under the NAFTA,
and, as a result, the B.C. Government will opt not to implement such meas-
ures. The Sierra Opinion notes that:
192
if [the B.C. government] did any of the
following, Weyerhaeuser could claim
compensation under Article 1110 of
NAFTA, on the basis that the government
had expropriated property or that its ac-
tions were tantamount to expropriation:
* created protected areas, including pro-
vincial parks, ecological reserves and
designations under the Environment
and Land Use Act, involving any
Crown land under license to Weyer-
haeuser or its subsidiaries;
" created critical wildlife areas under the
Wildlife Act involving any Crown land
under license to Weyerhaeuser or its
subsidiaries;
* settled First Nations treaties involving
any Crown land under license to Wey-
erhaeuser or its subsidiaries;
"
9 1d. at 6.
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" established resource management zone
objectives (e.g., special management
zones) and landscape unit objectives
(e.g., forest ecosystem networks or old
growth management areas) under the
Forest Practices Code that had the ef-
fect of reducing the cut levels of Wey-
erhaeuser or its subsidiaries;
* did not replace Weyerhaeuser's li-
censes when they came due for re-
placement but rather let them run their
full term (this could occur as part of an
initiative to reallocate the land or vol-
ume to communities when the licenses
expired);
* reduced the allowable annual cut for a
supply area, and the allowable annual
cut for licensees in it under section 63
of the Forest Act, in order to redistrib-
ute the volume to other individuals,
communities or companies;
* reduced, through the Timber Supply
Review process, the annual allowable
cut for Weyerhaeuser's tree farm li-
censes, or timber supply areas where
Weyerhaeuser holds forest licenses.
The Sierra Opinion further states that under Canadian law the Crown
retains the right to take away property without being liable to compensate
injured property owners. In support of this, the Sierra Opinion cites numer-
ous examples under B.C.'s Forest Act. For example, according to Ms.
Clogg, the Forest Act permits the B.C. Government to do the following
things without having to compensate licensees: (i) make proportionate re-
ductions in the annual allowable cut for forest licensees; (ii) reduce the an-
nual allowable cut when a licensee fails to live up to various environmental
and processing obligations; and/or (iii) remove up to 5% of the volume or
area of a license without compensation.19 3 The Sierra Opinion implicitly, if
not explicitly, concludes that, unlike under the Forest Act, a NAFTA in-
vestor, in this case Weyerhaeuser, would be entitled to compensation under
Article 1110 of the NAFTA in the event that the B.C. Government exer-
cised any of the above enumerated legislative powers which, as a result,
negatively impacted upon its timber licenses.
'
93 See id. at 7.
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The Sierra Opinion, thus, argues that first, ..... virtually any activity
that reduces the profitability of the Weyerhaeuser subsidiaries carrying on
business in B.C. could be caught by Article 1110 of NAFTA," 194 and sec-
ond, Chapter 11 "place(s) a major limitation on the provincial government's
capacity to effectively legislate in an area otherwise within its provincial ju-
risdiction.' '
95
Ms. Clogg does not, however, cite a single case or authority for her
conclusions. Rather, after stating that there ".... has yet to be any arbitral or
judicial consideration of the NAFTA expropriation and compensation pro-
visions," Ms. Clogg expressly admits that she has ".... set out what I con-
sider the most likely interpretations of these [i.e., Chapter 11 generally, and
Article 1110 specifically] provisions; however, we simply cannot predict
with certainty how a claim under Chapter 11 of NAFTA will be re-
solved."' 96 Rather than examining international law, the Sierra Opinion re-
lies exclusively on the breadth of claims alleged under Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA.
In addition to arguing that the NAFTA will have a drastic impact on
the B.C. Government's ability to legislate in favour of the environment and
forest conservation, the Sierra Opinion also reviewed, and was critical of,
the procedures for initiating a claim under Section B, Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA. This aspect of the Sierra Opinion is outside of the scope of the
paper and, as such, is not considered further herein. As well, the Sierra
Opinion examined the scope of certain key provisions of Chapter 11, such
as the meaning of investor and investment, but again this discussion is out-
side of the scope of this paper. Instead, borrowing from the discussion of
the international law of expropriation in Sections iI and IV above, the con-
clusions reached by the Sierra Opinion regarding the application of Article
1110 of the NAFTA to measures by the B.C. government in support of the
environment and forest conservation, such as those prescribed under B.C.'s
Forest Act, are considered in the next Section.
VI. ARTICLE 1110 OF THE NAFTA AND THE MACMILLAN BLOEDEL
TRANSACTION
A. Principal Comments on the Sierra Opinion
The Sierra Opinion suggests that virtually any interference with an in-
vestment of a NAFTA-investor would give rise to a concomitant obligation
on the offending Party to compensate the injured NAFTA-investor. Owing
to this expansive interpretation of Article 1110, the Sierra Opinion recom-
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tions necessary to allow Weyerhaeuser to complete the MB Acquisition.
By so doing, the Sierra Opinion turned Chapter 11 on its head in that it used
the Chapter, which establishes rules to ensure the fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory treatment of investments of investors in the territory of a
NAFTA Party, as a sword to argue against foreign investment in Canada.
197
The discussion in Sections I and IV of this paper demonstrated that
the interpretation of Article 1110 suggested by the Sierra Opinion is, for the
most part, exaggerated. The Sierra Opinion did not cite a single "judicial
decision [or] teaching of the most highly qualified publicist," two sources
of international law stated in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ.
While the Sierra Opinion correctly notes that the international law of ex-
propriation is not entirely settled, it is a far cry from being non-existent. As
already demonstrated, there exists significant jurisprudence regarding both
expropriation and police powers in international law (i.e., the writings of
esteemed jurists and arbitral decisions). Most of the confusion derives from
the application of the facts of a particular case to the principles of law.
However, a similar difficulty pervades both domestic and international law
generally. There is a significant difference between unsettled and evolving,
on the one hand, and non-existent and void of principles, on the other hand.
The international law of expropriations falls into the former category.
Simply stated, in order for an impugned measure to constitute an (indi-
rect) expropriation, or a measure tantamount to an expropriation, it must be
unreasonable and/or must result in a substantial deprivation or effective loss
of the use and enjoyment of an investment. A compensable injury will not
arise where there has been a mere interference with property that does not
exceed a threshold negative impact level. Where the impact of a measure
on an investment is merely ephemeral, subject to the specific facts of the
case, it will not amount to an expropriation. Furthermore, with respect to
measures in support of the environment and forest conservation, interna-
tional law recognizes the principle of police powers. Professor Brownlie
explained the existence of the police power defense as follows:
197 Interestingly, had the B.C. Government followed the Sierra Opinion, and thus not al-
lowed the MB Acquisition to be completed for fear of a potential future NAFTA claim, the
B.C. Government would have been susceptible to a claim under Chapter 11 on the basis that
such denial was discriminatory and, possibly expropriatory. Briefly, Article 1139 of the
NAFTA defines an "investor of a non-Party" to include an investor that "seeks to make" an
investment. On that basis, had the B.C. Government denied the MB Acquisition because it
was susceptible to a future claim, depending on the facts (e.g., if a Canadian or non-NAFTA
investor ended up being entitled to acquire MB), Weyerhaeuser may have been able to allege
discrimination under either Articles 1102 or 1103, or expropriation under Article 1110. As
well, the B.C. Government would not have had any justification to excuse its actions. Since
Weyerhaeuser's loss would not have resulted, for example, from an environmental or forest
conservation measure, but rather for fear that Weyerhaeuser may later initiate a claim under
the NAFTA, the Government could not have pointed to the police powers exception. The
Sierra Opinion may have, therefore, inadvertently recommended a strategy that would, itself,
result in a compensable injury under Chapter 11.
310
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State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of government, may
affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation. Thus
foreign assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade restrictions in-
volving licenses and quotas, or measures of devaluation. While special facts
alter cases, inprinciple such measures are not unlawful and do not constitute
expropriation.
Similarly, as already noted, the Third Restatement confirms that "[a]
state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvan-
tage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for
crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the
police power of states, if it is not discriminatory."' 99 While the demarcation
first, between a regulatory interference and an expropriation, and second,
between a compensable injury on the basis of an expropriation and a non-
compensable injury on the basis of the police powers defense, is not entirely
certain, a NAFTA Tribunal would be informed by the environmental prin-
ciples expressed in the NAFTA (e.g., in the Preamble, in Article 1114 and
in the Environmental Side Agreement).
Ms. Clogg was of the view that any incursion on an investment is
compensable. For example, the Sierra Opinion indicates that any of the
following incursions on Weyerhaeuser's investment would amount to an
expropriation: creation of protected areas or wildlife areas; reduction in cut
levels; reduction in allowable annual cut for timber supply areas; 5% hold-
back on the volume or area of a license; etc. Except in the case of the 5%
holdback, the Sierra Opinion does not delineate different treatment de-
pending on the degree of impact that these measures have on an investor's
investment. However, the previous review of the law suggests that in order
to constitute an expropriation, the affect on the investor or investment must
be substantial. The 5% holdback is certainly not more than ephemeral.
However, to conclude that all of the above-stated measures would auto-
matically be compensable under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, as the Sierra
Opinion does, is not consistent with the law.2°
198 BROWNLIE, supra note 15, at 532.
'"RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, at § 712, cmt. g. This Commentary was adopted by the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in Emanuel Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates (29
December 1989), 23 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 378, 387 (1991).2 00 In fact, the Sierra Opinion itself seems to acknowledge that the nature of a measure
cannot be considered in a vacuum, but instead must be considered in light of its affect on an
investor. At page 6 of the Opinion, Ms. Clogg states that "government action that affects
property controlled directly or indirectly by Weyerhaeuser in BC is caught by Article 1110".
Sierra Opinion, supra note 186, at 6. The Opinion then provides a shopping list of measures
that, if carried out by the B.C. Government, would constitute an expropriation. Id. at 7. The
Sierra Opinion, then compares this to Canadian law where, according to Ms. Clogg, in order
for a measure to be expropriatory the value of the negatively impacted property must ap-
proach zero: "In general, before expropriation is said to occur in Canadian law, the value of
the property expropriated must be reduced to zero, and there must be a corresponding acqui-
sition of that value by the government." Id. A comparison of the two above statements
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The Sierra Opinion relied entirely on the breadth of the claims initiated
by investors under Chapter 11 to conclude that Article 1110 of the NAFTA
has extended broad rights to NAFTA investors. While this could, arguably,
be a barometer for the types of claims that may be initiated under the
NAFTA, it is certainly not binding or particularly meaningful to an analysis
of the application of Article 1110. In any event, since the Sierra Opinion
was prepared, the decision in DESONA and Pope & Talbot demonstrate
that NAFTA arbitral tribunals are not going to greatly expand the scope of
Chapter 11. In DESONA, for example, the NAFTA Tribunal firmly held
that, in order to establish that a Party violated its commitment under Chap-
ter 11, the impugned measure must be one that falls within the four comers
of a specific obligation under that Chapter. Specifically, commenting on
the claimant's argument that the Ayuntamiento (the relevant governmental
authority in Mexico) expropriated its investment through the breach (termi-
nation) of its concession contract over local waste disposal operations, the
NAFTA Tribunal stated that:
To put it another way, a foreign investor entitled in principle to protection un-
der NAFTA may enter into contractual relations with a public authority, and
may suffer a breach by that authority, and still not be in a position to state a
claim under NAFTA. It is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be
disappointed in their dealings with public authorities, and disappointed yet
again when national courts reject their complaints. It may safely be assumed
that many Mexican parties can be found who had business dealings with gov-
ernmental entities which were not to their satisfaction; Mexico is unlikely to be
different from other countries in this respect. NAFTA was not intended to
provide foreign investors with blanket protection from this kind of disappoint-
ment, and nothing in its terms so provides.20 '
made in the Sierra Opinion would seem to suggest that international law and domestic law
are drastically different in that virtually any negative impact would be a compensable injury
under the former but not under the latter. However, it seems that the Sierra Opinion later ac-
knowledges that the degree of impact is also important to establishing a claim under interna-
tional law. In particular, the Sierra Opinion states that:
Experience with other claims made under Article 1110 indicates that Weyerhaeuser could conceiva-
bly seek compensation for virtually any government action that reduces the operations or profits of
its Canadian subsidiaries, in any part of its licence areas, or in relation to any of its processing facili-
ties. However, experience also demonstrates that such a claim would become more likely as the re-
duction in the value of its investment approached 100 percent (emphasis added).
Id. at 8.
Unfortunately, the Sierra Opinion never definitively acknowledged that the degree of im-
pact, rather than just any impact, is important to establishing a claim under Article 1110 of
the NAFTA.
2 01See Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitan & Ellen Baw v. United Mexican States, 14
ICSID Rev.-FILJ 538, para. 83 (1999). In fact, on the issue of whether the breach of a con-
cession contract amounted to an expropriation, absent other factors, such as that the im-
pugned measure being confiscatory, the NAFTA tribunal specifically stated that mere
contractual disputes will not be sufficient in order for an investor to initiate a claim under
Section B, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. Specifically, the tribunal stated that: "NAFTA does
not, however, allow investors to seek international arbitration for mere contractual breaches.
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In Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA arbitral tribunal refused to find a taking
on the basis of a loss of profitability; while in Metalclad, the NAFTA Tri-
bunal found a taking to exist after the Claimant'lost all benefits of owner-
ship of its landfill.
In the end, the Sierra Opinion exaggerates the potential impact of Arti-
cle 1110 of the NAFTA on the ability, legally and practically, of NAFTA
Parties to implement necessary environmental and conservation measures.
B. Secondary Comments on the Sierra Opinion
The primary criticism of the Sierra Opinion, as expressed above, is that
it ignores international law for interpreting the scope and meaning of Arti-
cle 1110 of the NAFTA. However, certain of the other conclusions reached
by the Sierra Opinion over the substantive application of Article 1110 de-
serve brief mention. In particular, the Sierra Opinion either made the fol-
lowing observations that are not necessarily true, or failed to raise the
following issues which demand closer attention.
The Sierra Opinion concluded that the MB Acquisition
will "impede" the B.C. Government's ability "to complete its protected ar-
eas system, honourably settle the First Nations' land question and redistrib-
ute control over our forest in ways that create new opportunities for BC
communities., 20 2 Furthermore, the Opinion asserted that Chapter 11 places
"a major limitation on the provincial government's capacity to effectively
legislate in an area otherwise entirely within its jurisdiction. 20 3 However,
the Sierra Opinion ignores the fact that the NAFTA does not preclude the
right of a Party to expropriate, but, in fact, confirms that right. Second, the
Sierra Opinion ignores the distribution of legislative powers in Canada un-
der the Constitution Ac?04 and the Constitution Act, 1982, whereby the
provinces have been granted exclusive legislative jurisdiction over a num-
ber of relevant matters, including property and civil rights in a province, as
well as the exploration, development and conservation of natural resources
in a province.5 Thus, notwithstanding that Article 105 of the NAFTA ob-
ligates the Parties to ensure that the provisions of the NAFTA are observed
by their state and provincial governments, the NAFTA itself does not re-
move the B.C. Government's inherent constitutional right to regulate in
support of its forest resources. The Government of Canada alone would be
the Party to a claim under Chapter 11 and, if necessary, responsible for
compensation. It then would be a matter of negotiation between B.C. Gov-
Indeed, NAFTA cannot possibly be read to create such a regime, which would have elevated
a multitude of ordinary transactions with public authorities into potential international dis-
putes." Id. para. 87202 Sierra Opinion, supra note 186, at 11.203 Id. at7.
204 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30-31 Vict., Chap. 3.205See id. at paras. 92(13) and (16).
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emnment and the Government of Canada as to how the costs would be ap-
portioned.
The MB Acquisition did not extend any additional rights to Weyer-
haeuser. As noted, prior to the MB Acquisition, through its existing Cana-
dian subsidiary, it was already a significant player in the Canadian forest
industry. As such, Weyerhaeuser did not need the MB Acquisition to initi-
ate a claim should, in the future, the Government of Canada violate Chapter
11 of the NAFTA.
Article 1139(b) of the NAFTA defines an "investment" to include "an
equity security of an enterprise." Accordingly, if the Sierra Opinion was
correct when it explained that any measure that affects the profitability of
an enterprise is subject to a claim under Chapter 11, then, assuming that
there were numerous existing U.S. shareholders of MB, the BC Govern-
ment was already susceptible to an expropriation claim in the event that its
environmental measures negatively affected the value of such U.S. inves-
tors' MB shares. In this sense, the MB Acquisition did not make the B.C.
Government (Federal Government) more susceptible to a claim, but rather
only affected the ultimate identity of the claimant(s).
As noted, since Article 1139 defines an "investor of a Party" to include
an enterprise "that seeks to make... an investment," had the B.C. Govern-
ment decided not to permit the MB Acquisition to proceed because of the
possibility of a future claim by Weyerhaeuser, this decision itself may have
amounted to an expropriation and, therefore, impose a concomitant obliga-
tion on the B.C. Government (Federal Government) to compensate Weyer-
haeuser.
The Sierra Opinion assumes that Weyerhaeuser would have viewed a
claim under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to be a zero-sum game. However,
except where an investor plans on exiting its host State altogether, it is
doubtful that many investors would ignore the potential political fallout that
may result by initiating a claim under Chapter 11. Many investors would
likely hesitate before initiating a claim or otherwise harass its host govern-
ment. Furthermore, when considering the likelihood of an investor using
Chapter 11 merely as a harassing technique, it should be borne in mind that
a NAFTA investor could always threaten to initiate proceedings against a
federal or provincial government under Canadian law and before a Cana-
dian court.
While none of the above points are individually significant, considered
collectively, they further call into question the merits of the views ex-
pressed in the Sierra Opinion.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 11 merely extends certain basic, fundamental rights to
NAFTA investors, such as non-discrimination, minimum standards of
treatment and transparency, and then empowers individual investors to en-
force these obligations before a binding dispute settlement regime. Con-
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trary to the views expressed in the Sierra Opinion, Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA will have no greater impact on the "capacity," explicitly or implic-
itly, of provincial, state and federal governments to adopt necessary envi-
ronmental and forest conservation measures than does every day factors.
From a legal perspective, provided that the requirements in paragraphs
(1)(a)-(d) of Article 1110 are met, Article 1110 (and confirmed by Article
1114) explicitly permits Parties to expropriate the investments of NAFTA
investors. However, practically, the NAFTA does not alter the basic right
of private citizens to sue their (host) government. If a NAFTA investor
merely intends to harass its host Party, it could do so just as easily under
domestic law. At best, the NAFTA provides NAFTA investors with an al-
ternative forum from which to pursue a claim. On that basis, Chapter 11 of
the NAFTA is relatively neutral as to its impact on whether a Party will im-
plement necessary environmental and forest conservation measures.
To date, most of the criticisms of Article 1110, and of Chapter 11 more
generally, have not been based on a well-considered and mature analysis of
general principles of international law. The Parties have agreed to ensure
that NAFTA investors in their territories will be accorded a certain mini-
mum level of treatment. To that end, the Sierra Opinion is correct to note
that it is theoretically possible that a NAFTA Party may be forced to pro-
vide certain treatment or a certain standard of compensation to NAFTA in-
vestors than they may otherwise have to provide their own citizens under
domestic law. This is, however, the precise purpose of Chapter 11, and,
more generally, of international legal agreements between nations, whether
such agreements deal with, for example, human rights, the environment or
fiscal matters. Chapter 11 ensures that NAFTA investors, at a minimum,
are on a level playing field with domestic and foreign investors in the terri-
tory of a Party. This includes a commitment that NAFTA investors receive
fair market value for their expropriated property.
206
However, before a NAFTA investor is entitled to receive compensation
for an interference with his or here investment, there first must be an expro-
priation. The mere allegation of an expropriation is not sufficient. Simi-
larly, the fact that a measure has a detrimental impact on the investment is
not necessarily sufficient to make out an expropriation. Rather, the effect
must exceed a certain threshold level. The police powers defense further
recognizes the inherent right of a Party to regulate in support of the public
interest and, provided that it does not go too far or is not otherwise dis-
criminatory, will absolve the Party from paying compensation. The Sierra
Opinion, unfortunately, either missed or ignored this distinction.
206See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110:2,
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